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I. INTRODUCTION 
 If a pollster asked a random selection of Americans for a one-line 
verbal portrait of arbitration, common responses might include the 
following: (i) private litigation arising for construction and business 
disputes; (ii) a mechanism to resolve workplace tensions between 
management and labor; (iii) a process by which finance companies 
and stock brokers shield themselves from customer complaints; (iv) a 
way to level the playing field in deciding commercial controversies 
among companies from different parts of the world; (v) the way big 
corporations use NAFTA to escape regulation. To some extent all 
would be correct.1  
 Unfortunately, these different varieties of arbitration have all 
been squeezed into the same antiquated arbitration statute. Enacted 
75 years ago as a simple procedural device to enforce arbitration in 
federal courts, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has now been 
pressed into service as a body of substantive law that binds state 
courts as well, requiring that arbitration agreements be enforced on 
the same footing as other contracts.2 The Act is as ill-suited to such 
use as an all-terrain vehicle. As drafted, the FAA ignores critical 
distinctions in the level of judicial supervision suitable to different 
types of cases. The laissez-faire court scrutiny appropriate to an 
international proceeding, between sophisticated business managers 
with access to competent counsel, may be quite misplaced in a 
consumer case, where an arbitration clause might require an ill-
________________________________________________________________ 
 1. Divergent portrayals of arbitration bring to mind the John Godfrey Saxe 
poem The Elephant, about six sightless men describing a pachyderm. Having touched 
only one part of the anatomy (side, tusk, trunk, knee, ear, and tail), each respectively 
thought the elephant to be like a wall, spear, snake, tree, fan, and rope. The verses 
conclude, “And so these men of Indostan disputed loud and long, each in his own 
opinion exceeding stiff and strong, though each was partly in the right, and all were in 
the wrong.” John Godfry Saxe, The Blind Man and the Elephant, in THE POEMS OF 
JOHN GODFRY SAXE 135 (J.R. Osgood ed., 1873).  
 2. See discussion infra Section V.B (discussing Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 
517 U.S. 681 (1996)).  
informed individual to seek uncertain remedies at an inaccessible 
venue.3 Moreover, basic arbitration notions are hidden in a maze of 
inconsistent cases that are anything but user friendly: they disorient 
and confuse litigants from abroad, adding significant transaction 
costs to the choice of arbitration in the United States.4  
 The time has come to consider amending the FAA to provide 
greater clarity for international arbitration. One springboard for 
reform can be found in the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law,5 
which has already engendered a rich case law that could serve as a 
prism to separate and identify many of the interrelated themes in 
cross-border arbitration.6 The Model Law, however, should not be 
imported wholesale.7 Any amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act 
must take account of home grown arbitration concerns and 
precedents.8 Part of the peculiar U.S. genius has been our ability to 
adapt (rather than adopt) inventions from abroad.9  
________________________________________________________________ 
 3. See generally id.  
 4. The transaction costs to the parties (including attorneys fees for appellate 
review) are different from those incurred by society, which must pay judges to decide 
cases. For both the parties and society there may be costs resulting from the risk of an 
incorrect result which would constitute one factor weighing in favor of judicial review.  
 5. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, adopted June 21, 1985. As of the end of 2002, 
the Model Law had been adopted by more than fifty jurisdictions, including four U.S. 
states (California, Connecticut, Oregon, and Texas) and all of Canada’s provinces. 
 6. See generally HENRI C. ALVAREZ, NEIL KAPLAN & DAVID RIVKIN, MODEL 
LAW DECISIONS: CASES APPLYING THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003).  
 7. One commentator has described the UNCITRAL Model Act as “an ersatz 
statute divorced from the rich and distinctively American federal experience with 
arbitration” and suggested that what is needed is “a work of renovation, the dusting of 
an antique, not a revolution.” Joseph D. Becker, Fixing the Federal Arbitration Act by 
the Millennium, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 75, 75 (1997).  
 8. For a more ambitious proposal on adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
see Jack J. Coe, A Critical Appraisal of the Federal Arbitration Act 1925 and of the 
Suitability of the Model Law as Its Replacement for International Commercial Disputes 
(1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics) (on file with 
author). Compare the more cautious alternative advocated in William W. Park, The 
Interaction of Courts and Arbitrators in England: The 1996 Act as a Model for the 
United States?, 1 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 54, 67 (1998). For commentary positive to the 
Model Law, see James Carter, Federal Arbitration Act Seen as Out of Step with Modern 
Laws, 5 NEWS AND NOTES FROM INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1 (1990) 
(criticizing utility of UNCITRAL Model law for U.S.); Report of the Committee on State 
International Arbitration Statutes (ABA Subcommittee, Section on International Law 
and Practice, March 1990). Compare the less favorable evaluations in David Rivkin & 
Frances Kellner, In Support of the FAA: An Argument Against U.S. Adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 535 (1990); Report of the Washington 
Foreign Law Society on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, reprinted in 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303 (1988); Report of the 
Committee on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York, reprinted in 1988-89 ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 250 (1989).  
 9. For comparative studies of the various options available as legal 
frameworks for arbitration in several major arbitral centers, see JEAN-FRANÇOIS 
POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, DROIT COMPARE DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL 
(2002); JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN KROLL COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2003). 
 
 The most critical need is for limitations on judicial review of 
international arbitration awards, permitting international arbitration 
law to evolve free from whatever paternalistic measures might be 
appropriate to domestically cultivated concerns.10 Such reform would 
facilitate efficient and neutral dispute resolution by keeping judges 
from second guessing arbitrators on the merits of a dispute, while 
still permitting courts to support arbitration by enforcement of 
agreements and awards, as well as through interim measures in aid 
of arbitration.11  
 It is well known, of course, that certain arbitration service 
providers and industry groups oppose change.12 They justify their 
reform-phobia by reference to the vagaries of the U.S. legislative 
process.13 Once Congress goes into motion (so some fear), a Pandora’s 
Box of special interests will open to unleash forces that would 
eviscerate arbitration’s effectiveness. 
 Such skepticism of the democratic process is misplaced. There is 
no reason to think that Americans today are less capable of 
intelligent legislation than they were in the past. Moreover, the winds 
________________________________________________________________ 
 10. A separate set of provisions for review of international awards is not the 
only task confronting those hoping to enhance the quality of American arbitration law. 
For a European perspective on U.S. arbitration law reform, see Pierre-Yves Tschanz, 
International Arbitration in the United States: The Need for a New Act, 3 ARB. INT’L 
309 (1987). On FAA reform, see generally authorities cited in note 8. See also Charles 
A. Hunnicut et al., Report to the Washington Foreign Law Society on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
303, 303 (1988); American Arbitration Association, Office of the General Counsel, 
Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as 
Federal or State Legislation, ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 250, 250-62 (1988); André J. 
Brunel, A Proposal to Adopt UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration as Federal or State Legislation, 25 TEX. INT’L L. J. 43 (1990); A Report of 
the New York State Bar Association International Litigation Committee, Commercial 
and Federal Litigation Section, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, 23:87 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 87, 87-88 (1990-1991); Daniel 
M. Kolkey, Reflections on the U.S. Statutory Framework for International Commercial 
Arbitrations: Its Scope, its Shortcomings, and the Advantages of U.S. Adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 491, 491 (1990). 
 11. Some cynics might question whether U.S. courts would in fact pay 
attention to an amendment of the FAA. See, e.g., comments of Richard W. Hulbert, 
Proceedings of The Institute of Judicial Administration Conference on Arbitration, 
NYU (Sept. 19, 2002). In a case confirming application of the FAA in state courts, 
Justice O’Connor expressed similar disenchantment with judicial interpretation of 
federal arbitration law, suggesting that “over the past decade the Court has abandoned 
all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration 
Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.” Allied-Bruce 
Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995).  
 12. See generally Hulbert, supra note 11.  
 13. At a recent colloquium in New York, the General Counsel of an important 
arbitrator service provider referred to the “shivers down the spine” produced by 
mention of FAA amendment.  
of change are already blowing, and the question is no longer if but 
how reform will occur.14 
II. THE ARCHITECTURE OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 
A. Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act 
 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) subjects most arbitration in 
the United States to a single standard for judicial review,15 
regardless of whether the dispute is big or small, domestic or 
international, and notwithstanding state attempts to create a more 
nuanced framework for arbitration.16 As a consequence, international 
arbitration unfolds haunted by the specter of anti-abuse measures 
intended to protect consumers and employees,17 relying on the 
exercise of judicial discretion in an inefficient, case-by-case fashion.18 
________________________________________________________________ 
 14. A more practical concern relates to the difficulty of obtaining reform. 
Certain fatalists suggest that time and energy would be wasted in advancing a 
proposal which the American Arbitration Association and industry groups would seek 
to torpedo. This is an odd objection. The urge to improve, one would hope, remains 
valid notwithstanding opposition from entrenched interest groups. History is full of 
intelligent propositions (whether economic, political, social or religious) that were once 
fiercely contested by established orthodoxy. 
 15. The U.S. Supreme Court has construed narrowly the FAA exclusion of 
“contracts of employment” to cover only contracts for “transportation workers” such as 
seamen and railroad employees who provide services directly in foreign or interstate 
commerce. Collective bargaining agreements, however, rest on a separate statutory 
foundation with an ill-defined relationship to the FAA. See Taft-Hartley Labor-
Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2003); see also Textile Workers 
Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (holding that federal 
courts may fashion a body of federal law specifically for enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements). 
 16. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1297.11; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 50a-100; FLORIDA 
STAT. § 684; OR. REV. STAT. § 36.450; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 172.001 
(exemplifying state initiatives inspired by or incorporating principles of the 
UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Act). However, the preemptive effect of federal law 
relegates state arbitration statues to gap-filling on ancillary matters, thus giving state 
statutes only marginal impact. For example, an arbitrator’s authorization to 
administer oaths derives from UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 7. The validity of a state 
rule depends on its perceived harmony with the policies underlying federal law.  
 17. See, e.g., discussion of “manifest disregard of the law” infra Section IV.A. 
For judicial agonizing over how to treat arbitration agreements in employment 
contracts, see generally Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001). 
See discussion infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text; Wright v. Universal 
Maritime Services, 525 U.S. 70, 76 (1998); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 
20 (1991); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration & Voluntary Consent, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996). For similar concerns about consumer and small business 
arbitration, see generally Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (1998); ITT Cons. 
Fin. Corp. v. Patterson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (1993); Teleserve Sys. v. MCI, 659 N.Y.2d 
658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (A.D. 1st Dept. 
1998). See generally Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM 
L. REV. (1995). 
 18. In one case the court ordered costly discovery on the very fairness of 
institutional arbitration. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, 965 F. Supp. 190, 192 
(D. Mass. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Specht v. 
 
Understanding the American framework for arbitration requires a 
brief look at the Second Circuit decision in Alghanim v. Toys ‘R’ Us,19 
which held that domestic judicial review standards applied to awards 
rendered in international arbitrations with a U.S. situs.20 The case, 
which involved a $46 million award rendered in New York in favor of 
a Kuwaiti licensee of a U.S. toy store,21 was challenged for alleged 
“manifest disregard of the law” by the arbitrator—a ground for 
vacatur under domestic law but not under the New York Arbitration 
Convention.22 
 One must remember that when adopting the 1958 New York 
Arbitration Convention, the United States accepted its application 
not only to awards rendered abroad, but also to so-called “non-
domestic awards.”23 The award in Toys ‘R’ Us fell under the latter 
category (“non-domestic”) and thus was subject to the Convention. 
Two of the three parties were non-American, and the underlying 
agreement involved performance in the Middle East.24  
 Convention awards would normally be subject to FAA § 207, 
which provides that a court “shall confirm the award” unless it finds 
one of the defenses to recognition contained in Convention Article 
V.25 These defenses essentially supply escape hatches related to 
                                                                                                                       
Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 40 (2d Cir. 2002), refusing to enforce 
arbitration clause included in downloaded software. In action for alleged violations of 
federal privacy laws; the Court held that reasonably prudent internet users would not 
have learned of arbitration before downloading software, since agreement to arbitrate 
presented at bottom of scroll-down screen; cf. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 
1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing arbitration clause in shrinkwrap license included with 
software).  
 19. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23-25 (2d 
Cir. 1997).  
 20. Domestic arbitration is covered by Chapter 1 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. 
(2000). Chapters 2 and 3 are designed principally to address recognition of awards 
made under the New York and Panama Conventions, which covers principally foreign 
awards.  
 21. The Hong Kong affiliate of Toys ‘R’ Us was also implicated in the 
arbitration. Toys ‘R’ Us, 126 F.3d at 15. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Foreign awards are described as “made in the territory of a State other 
than . . . where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought,” while non-
domestic awards are defined to include “awards not considered as domestic awards in 
the State where recognition and enforcement are sought.” New York Convention, art. 
I(1) (June 10, 1958). By contrast, the United Kingdom took a different approach in a 
reservation applying the Convention “only to . . . awards made in the territory of 
another Contracting State.” British arbitration legislation limits the scope of the New 
York Convention to awards made in the territory of a state “other than the United 
Kingdom.” Arbitration Act, 1996, § 100(1) (Eng.). The United States took no such 
reservation. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) (including within the scope of the Convention even 
arbitration agreements entirely between American citizens as long as related to 
property, performance or enforcement abroad, or bearing some “reasonable relation” to 
a foreign country). 
 24. Id. 
 25. New York Convention, art. I(1) (June 10, 1958, art). 
procedural due process, public policy, and vacatur at the place where 
an award is made.26  
 Drawing what seems to be a distinction between motions to 
confirm and motions to vacate awards, and notwithstanding the 
language of FAA § 207, the Court in Toys ‘R’ Us found that a non-
domestic award made in the United States would be subject to 
vacatur “in accordance with its domestic arbitration law and its full 
panoply of express and implied grounds for relief” including “manifest 
disregard of the law.”27  
 Not all jurisdictions follow the Toys ‘R’ Us approach. The 
Eleventh Circuit has held that the New York Convention’s grounds 
for refusal to confirm foreign awards were also the exclusive bases on 
which to review a “non-domestic” award made in the United States.28 
A federal district court in Miami came to the same result with respect 
to a motion to confirm an award among foreign parties made in 
Florida.29 
________________________________________________________________ 
 26. Id. Article V permits non-recognition in the event of (i) invalid arbitration 
agreement, (ii) lack of proper notice, (iii) arbitrator excess of authority, (iv) irregular 
composition of the arbitral tribunal, (v) award vacatur at the place where (or under the 
law of which) made, (vi) non-arbitrable subject matter or (vii) violation of public policy. 
Id. art. V. 
 27. Toys ‘R’ Us, 126 F.3d at 23. The court in Toys ‘R’ Us held that the award in 
question did not constitute “manifest disregard of the law.” For other cases in which 
federal courts have been asked to subject international awards to domestic vacatur 
standards, including “manifest disregard of the law,” see Lummus Global Amazonas, 
S.A. v. Aguaytra Energy de Peru, 2002 WL 31401996 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (vacating in part 
and confirming in part an award arising from construction of a natural gas pipeline in 
Peru; modified to incorporate the parties’ joint stipulation on construction credits), 
Westinghouse Int’l Serv. Co. v. Merilectrica, D. Mass., C.A. No. 00-11832 (Sept. 27, 
2001) (upholding an award in a South American power plant construction dispute). See 
also discussion of Westerbeke v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 220-23 (2d Cir. 
2002) infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text. See also Industrial Risk Insurance v. 
M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte G.m.b.H., 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998); Four Seasons 
Hotels and Resorts B. V. v Consorcio Barr S.A. 267 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 28. Industrial Risk Insurance, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441-42 (11th Cir. 1998) (involving 
a AAA arbitration in Florida between a German corporation and an U.S. insurer). The 
dispute arose from malfunction of a “tail gas expander,” a turbine generating electricity 
from waste gasses in nitric acid manufacture. Id. Giving a broad scope to the concept of 
“non-domestic” arbitration award, the court held that an award made in the United 
States falls within the purview of the New York Convention, and is thus governed 
exclusively by Chapter 2 of the FAA. Id. at 1441.  
 29. Four Seasons Hotels, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1335-37 (S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(applying the New York Convention as the exclusive grounds for considering 
confirmation of a AAA award rendered in Miami). The dispute between two foreign 
corporations concerned a hotel operation in Caracas, which the parties had subjected to 
Venezuelan law. The court also found that the New York Convention trumped the 
Inter-American Arbitration Convention, since not all parties to the relevant 
agreements were from countries that had adhered to the latter treaty. The court clearly 
distinguished between an enforcement action and an action to vacate By virtue of the 
Miami situs of the proceedings, U.S. rather than Venezuelan courts were found to be 
the competent authority to vacate the award. Personal jurisdiction over the Venezuelan 
party was found by virtue of its participation in the Florida-based arbitration. The 
court also gave an interesting analysis of personal jurisdiction under the federal “long-
arm statute” contained in Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 
 
B. The Need for a New Statute  
 Such conflation of domestic and international arbitration is a bad 
idea as a matter of both sound policy and national self-interest. 
Rather than a hospitable climate for international arbitration, the 
business community is left with little clear guidance to predict how 
courts will react to allegations of arbitrator error. Diverse cases call 
for different levels of judicial review, with the least interventionist 
role assumed in arbitration between sophisticated business entities 
from different countries.  
 The United States remains a victim of a self-inflicted competitive 
disadvantage imposed by its single legal framework for arbitration. 
The spillover of domestic precedents into international cases will 
inevitably chill selection of U.S. cities for arbitration (with fewer fees 
to arbitrators and counsel) by foreign parties understandably hoping 
to avoid excessive judicial interference.  
 The FAA should be amended to provide a separate framework for 
international arbitration that would contain default rules limiting 
judicial review of awards to the narrowest grounds. In addition, 
parties might be given appropriate options to select greater judicial 
scrutiny. Such reform would keep courts away from arbitration 
except to support the process by enforcing agreements and awards 
and supplying interim measures in aid of arbitration.  
 Reform could be accomplished either through tinkering with the 
existing FAA Chapters 2 and 3 or by adding a new chapter which 
would cover all international proceedings in the United States, 
regardless of whether they fit within these two treaties. The latter 
approach, casting a wide net, might be the preferred avenue, since it 
could help limit misguided judicial inventions to fill either real or 
perceived gaps in the coverage of international arbitration.30  
 Some might observe that good arguments also exist for broader 
gauge change to protect all business arbitration, domestic as well as 
international, from excessive judicial review on grounds such as 
“manifest disregard.” The proposal in this paper is intentionally more 
modest, however, stemming from a concern that wider modifications 
of the FAA would meet more significant political impediments, thus 
reducing the prospect of reform in the international arena, where the 
________________________________________________________________ 
 30. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cortez Byrd, which 
justified expansive venue for award vacatur as a way to permit American courts to 
“vacate awards rendered in foreign arbitrations not covered by either convention.” 
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 203, 203 (2000) (discussed 
infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text).  
special need for neutrality makes arbitration’s efficiency particularly 
vital. As Voltaire observed, the best is often the enemy of the good.31 
C. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
1. The Wilko Dictum 
 By statute, courts have been given power to vacate awards for 
defects in the basic procedural integrity of the arbitration,32 but not 
with regard to either vague notions of public policy33 or the merits of 
a dispute. Fifty years ago, however, this statutory scheme was 
amplified by dictum in a U.S. Supreme Court case prohibiting 
securities arbitration. In Wilko v. Swan, the Court added “manifest 
disregard of the law” as a basis for award vacatur.34 This power to set 
________________________________________________________________ 
 31. See generally, VOLTAIRE, LES OEUVRES COMPLETES DE VOLTAIRE, Oxford 
(2000). Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien. Voltaire himself was apparently adapting an old 
Italian proverb, Le meglio è l’inimico del bene.  
 32. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides for vacatur (i) for award procurement by 
corruption, fraud or undue means, (ii) evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, (iii) arbitrator misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing or in 
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, and any other 
“misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced,” (iv) where the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers or “so imperfectly executed” their powers that a final 
award upon the subject matter was not made. For a survey of these grounds for 
vacatur, see generally Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial 
Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial 
Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1998). See also Stephen L. Hayford 
& Scott Kenigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory Grounds for Judicial Review of 
Commercial Awards, 50 DISPUTE RESOLUTION J. 22 (Oct. 1996); Stephen L. Hayford, 
Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 
30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996).  
 33. Although labor cases permit an award to be set aside for contravention of 
public policy, United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 47 (1987), 
the FAA contains no reference to public policy as a ground for vacatur of an award. It is 
uncertain whether in commercial arbitration violation of substantive public policy 
constitutes a ground for vacatur. See Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int’l Mktg., 811 F.2d 
1265, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1987) (implicating alleged illegal commissions to intermediaries 
in armament contracts). After an arbitral tribunal had interpreted the governing law 
(California) as permitting such commissions, a federal district court vacated the award 
as “contrary to law and public policy,” only to be reversed by the Court of Appeals, 
which held that U.S. policy was too ill-defined to justify annulment of the award.  
 34. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). See generally Noah Rubins, 
“Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards in the United States, 
12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363 (2002).  Wilko was overruled in Shearson/American 
Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 224-25 (1987) (fraud claims under Exchange Act § 
10b and Rule 10b-5) and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 
477, 477 (1989) (Securities Act § 12(2) claims). Ironically, when the Wilko Court 
invented “manifest disregard of the law,” it considered the concept as unduly restrictive 
of judicial review. The fact that a finding of “manifest disregard” was the only way 
courts could address a mistake was seen as evidence of the need to nip securities 
arbitration in the bud by declaring the topic non-arbitrable. The Court stated:  
[I]nterpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest 
disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for 
error in interpretation. The United States Arbitration Act contains no 
 
aside awards provides perhaps the most compelling motive for FAA 
reform. 
 Some interpretations of this concept take a restrictive view, 
building on notions of “excess of authority”35 to limit the principle to 
decisions that ignore the contract or require parties to violate the 
law.36 Other courts, however, have taken a more expansive view, 
effectively including mistakes of law37 and moving well beyond the 
consumer and employment context for which the doctrine had been 
conceived.  
 Yet another approach to “manifest disregard” has been suggested 
in Williams v. CIGNA Financial Advisors Inc.38 and Bridas S.A.P.I.C. 
v. Government of Turkmenistan.39 In these decisions, the Fifth 
                                                                                                                       
provision for judicial determination of legal issues such as is found in 
the English law. [Apparently a reference to the “case stated” provision 
abolished in 1979.] As the protective provisions of the Securities Act 
require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their 
effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress must have intended [Section 
14 of the Securities Act, forbidding waiver of securities laws] to apply to 
waiver of judicial trial and review.  
Wilko, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).  
 35. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(4) (2003).  
 36. See, e.g., Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1990) (Selya, 
J.) (affirming a lower court’s refusal to vacate an award in a case wherein an investor 
alleged that a broker wrongfully liquidated his holdings). The Court held that an 
honest failure of interpreting the law is not enough to justify vacatur, which requires a 
decision “contrary to the plain language” of the agreement or an indication that the 
arbitrator “recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.” Id. at 8. Cf. Watt v. 
Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001). In Watt, Judge Easterbrook (for better 
or for worse) aligned the concept with public policy, which in an international context 
might diverge from applicable law. For example, an employment agreement to be 
performed abroad might discriminate on the basis of gender or religion in a way 
acceptable under the applicable foreign law. The court stated, “If manifest legal errors 
justified upsetting an arbitrator’s decision, then the relation between judges and 
arbitrators . . . would break down.” Id. at 579. Judge Easterbrook interpreted the test 
for vacatur as simply that “an arbitrator may not direct the parties’ to violate the law.” 
Id. at 580. 
 37. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, 148 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1034 (1999) (reversing decision that refused to vacate award denying 
age discrimination claim). See also Westerbeke v. Daihatsu, 304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(discussed infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text). Only a few years ago one of the 
finest U.S. arbitration scholars described the elements that a losing party must prove 
to demonstrate “manifest disregard,” and then concluded, “[t]his will never happen in 
our lifetimes.” Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 214, 238 (1996). Professor Rau not only feels that “manifest disregard” 
is a dead letter, but “in operation the review standards of the Convention and the FAA 
will be identical.” Id. at 236. 
 38. Williams v. CIGNA Financial Advisors Ind., 197 F.3d 752, 760-61 (5th Cir. 
1999). Williams involved an age discrimination employment case arbitrated under 
NASD rules. See generally Noah Rubins, “Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur 
of Arbitral Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363 (2001). 
 39. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan, 2003 WL 22077651 (5th 
Cir. 2003). Here, an Argentinean corporation sought to confirm an ICC award rendered 
Circuit followed a two-prong inquiry in which it determined first 
whether it was manifest that the arbitrators disregarded applicable 
law. Thereafter, the court considered whether the award would result 
in “significant injustice” under the circumstances of the case. Even if 
there was “manifest disregard,” an award would be upheld as long as 
no injustice resulted. 
 The problem is not necessarily in the “manifest disregard” 
doctrine itself, which properly applied may have a salutary effect 
where a special need exists for greater judiciary supervision. Rather, 
the difficulty lies in the doctrine’s potential for mischief and misuse in 
large international cases, when zealous litigators may be tempted to 
press “manifest disregard” into service as a proxy for attack on the 
substantive merits of an award. 
2. Westerbeke v. Daihatsu 
 The risks of subjecting international cases to domestic grounds 
for vacatur are illustrated in Westerbeke v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 
Ltd.,40 involving breach of a distribution agreement by a Japanese 
manufacturer. A Japanese manufacturer had given a U.S. company 
an exclusive right to sell certain contractually defined categories of 
engines. If the manufacturer wanted to market a new line of 
products, the sales agreement gave the distributor a right of first 
refusal during a period of six months.41  
 Ultimately, the deal went sour over a new product line that the 
manufacturer began offering through another North American 
distributor. The parties ended up in arbitration pursuant to 
provisions of the 1952 Japan-U.S. Trade Arbitration Agreement 
referenced in their contract.42 
 The arbitrator awarded the distributor more than $4 million, 
having found the sales agreement to constitute a binding contract 
with a condition precedent in the form of a requirement that new 
lines of engines were subject to a right of first refusal. The 
manufacturer brought a motion to vacate the award, arguing that the 
parties had reached only a “preliminary agreement to agree.”43 
                                                                                                                       
in Houston (the parties having agreed to abandon Stockholm, the contractually 
stipulated situs) under English law against the government of Turkmenistan and a 
government-owned oil company. Not only did it refuse to vacate find any “manifest 
disregard” of the law, the court also refused to vacate the award for excess of 
jurisdiction and held that the government itself could not be forced to arbitrate as the 
oil company’s alter ego. Id. at *13-14.  
 40. Westerbeke, 304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2002), rev’g 162 F. Supp. 2d 278 (2001).  
See also Hoeft v. MVL Group Inc., 242 F.3d 57 (2003), reversing lower court decision 
vacating an award for “manifest disregard” in an arbitration arising from a dispute 
over a purchase price adjustment in the sale of a corporation engaged in market 
research. 
 41. Id. at 204-05.  
 42. Id. at 205.  
 43. Id. at 206.  
 
Without a binding contract, the manufacturer argued, there could be 
no recovery for expectancy damages (purchase of substitution goods 
and lost profits), which was exactly what had been granted in the 
arbitration.44  
 To complicate matters, the arbitration had been bifurcated. A 
liability phase addressed whether the new product was indeed an 
engine within the terms of the contract. Then a subsequent stage 
assessed the claimant’s damages. Unfortunate language in the 
Interlocutory Award on liability (which arguably had res judicata 
effect when it came time to draft the final decision) gave rise to an 
argument that the arbitrator had decided the manufacturer owed no 
more than a duty to negotiate in good faith.45 
 The district court disagreed and vacated the award, holding that 
the arbitrator had misapplied the New York law on damages. As an 
additional ground for vacatur, the court held that the theory of 
liability expressed in the first stage of the proceedings differed from 
that articulated in the damages stage.46  
 A year later the Second Circuit reversed, upholding the award of 
lost profits. In deciding whether there had been “manifest disregard,” 
the Court of Appeals announced a two prong test. An objective 
element required inquiry into whether the relevant law was “well 
defined, explicit and clearly applicable.” A subjective component of 
the test involved examination of whether the arbitrator intentionally 
ignored the law.47  
 Applying this approach, the Court of Appeals looked first at New 
York law on damages, which it found consistent with the arbitrator’s 
award on the facts of the case. The court then proceeded to examine 
the arbitrator’s intent, and found no evidence of knowing refusal to 
apply the governing law. Finally, the court addressed the alleged 
inconsistency between the Interlocutory and Final Awards. Giving 
the arbitrator the benefit of the doubt, the court interpreted 
ambiguous language in the Interlocutory Award in light of what the 
court called a “clarification” in the Final Award, which had found the 
sales agreement to constitute a contract with conditions precedent 
rather than simply an “agreement to agree.”48  
 Although the case itself had a happy ending for the arbitration’s 
prevailing party, the process involved costly appellate briefing and 
argument. The Court of Appeals had to examine the New York law on 
calculation of damages, as well as the difference between a 
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 44. By contrast, “reliance damages” would have been limited to amounts 
actually expended by reason of depending on the seller’s promise, rather than the 
“benefit of the bargain” of expected profits. Id. at 223. 
 45. Id. at 212.  
 46. See id.  
47. Id. at 216. 
 48. Id. at 212. 
“preliminary agreement” on one hand and a binding contract with 
condition precedent on the other.49 The court also had to explore the 
very nature of “manifest disregard” and other domestically nurtured 
defenses to award enforcement,50 and investigate the facts that might 
give an indication of the arbitrator’s state of mind when deciding the 
case.  
 The very existence of the right to have judicial review on the 
substantive merits of the case (particularly on a ground for challenge 
as vague as “manifest disregard”) hangs over international 
arbitration like a sword of Damocles, to be grasped by litigators and 
judges alike. In principle, there would be nothing wrong with having 
these questions decided in court. However, the parties had by 
contract agreed to have the merits of their dispute decided by 
arbitrators, not judges. The prospect of such judicial meddling in the 
arbitral process can only alarm foreign enterprises contemplating 
arbitration in the United States. The procedural and political 
neutrality of international dispute resolution is compromised each 
time a local judge intervenes in response to aggressive litigation 
strategies that invoke precedents from domestic contexts.  
 Such temptations should be placed out of reach through a new 
chapter in the FAA, expressly foreclosing back door judicial 
interference with the merits of international cases. Giving litigants 
from abroad a measure of confidence that the U.S. judiciary will not 
unduly meddle in the substance of the case, such an amendment 
would promote efficient international dispute resolution and would 
make the United States a more user-friendly place to arbitrate.  
III. THE SPECIFICITY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
A. Arbitration’s Role in Cross-Border Transactions 
 The need for special deference to arbitration and forum selection 
clauses in international business was articulated thirty years ago in a 
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Addressing the problematic 
nature of international litigation, the Court stated:  
Much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties 
could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction [where 
personal or in rem jurisdiction might be established]. The elimination of 
all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to 
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 49. Id. at 202. 
 50. For example, the Court had to consider the “essence of the agreement” 
arguments derived from collective bargaining decisions rendered more than forty years 
earlier in the so-called “Steelworkers Trilogy” cases. See United Steelworkers v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); see also Steelworkers v. 
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-85 (1960). Under this line of cases courts may vacate 
an award that does not “draw its essence” from the contract. 
 
both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, 
commerce, and contracting.51  
 While the adjectives “all” and “indispensable” may constitute a 
bit of hyperbole, the basic point seems beyond cavil. In a world 
lacking any neutral courts of mandatory jurisdiction over 
transactions that cross national borders,52 arbitration usually does 
impose itself on international transactions faute de mieux, bringing to 
mind Churchill’s famous observation about democracy.53 Courts have 
enforced arbitration agreements in international cases involving 
subjects that could not have been arbitrated in a single country 
context, including securities,54 antitrust55 and bankruptcy.56  
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 51. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) (addressing 
the need for certainty in the context of court selection clauses). Similar principles were 
adopted for arbitration in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co, 417 U.S. 506, 522 (1974) and 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631-33 (1985). 
 52. While a court in the United States exercising jurisdiction over a foreign 
respondent might appear neutral to the U.S. side, the perception from abroad might be 
quite different. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) is limited 
to state-to-state claims. A government must espouse the cause of its national, which is 
rare with respect to private investment. Moreover, when the I.C.J has heard 
investment claims during the past thirty years, the private investor has lost. See 
Elettronica Sicula SPA (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 28 I.L.M. 1109 (1989) 
(finding that there was no illegal taking when Italy requisitioned U.S.-owned plant to 
prevent liquidation, and discussing in paragraph 48 the terms of Article 36 of the 1948 
FCN Treaty between Italy and the United States); see also Barcelona Traction 
(Belgium v. Spain) (2d Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 9 I.L.M. 227 (1970) (not permitting 
Belgium to bring claim of Belgian-owned Canadian company effectively dispossessed by 
Franco of profitable Spanish assets). See generally F.A. Mann, Foreign Investment in 
the International Court of Justice, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 92 (1992).  
 53. Many forms of government have been tried, and will be tried in this world 
of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has 
been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time.  
3 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, COMPLETE SPEECHES (1897-1963) 7566 (Robert Rhodes 
James ed., 1974). The great statesman made the comment in the context of a House of 
Commons debate on changes to the so-called Parliament Act on November 11, 1947. 
 54. See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506, 511-13 (1974) (securities disputes arbitrable in a 
German-American contract, at a time when the doctrine in Wilko v. Swan banned such 
arbitration domestically). 
 55. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
631-33 (1985) (anti-trust disputes arbitrable in a Japanese-American contract, at a 
time when the American Safety doctrine banned arbitration of Sherman Act claims in 
contracts entirely among U.S. residents). Much of the reasoning of Mitsubishi might 
apply equally to domestic as well as international arbitration. Some observers feel that 
the international focus of the decision was a way to make the result easier to swallow 
by the public. See Jill A. Pietrowski, Comment, Enforcing International Commercial 
Arbitration Agreements—Post Mistsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, 
Inc., 36 AM. U.L. REV. 57, 85 (1986) (critiquing the Court’s decision). 
 56. For an example of a case in which an American company in search of the 
home court advantage in Massachusetts bankruptcy court attempted to use the 
bankruptcy laws to renege on its commitment to arbitrate, see Société Nationale 
Algérienne pour la Recherche, le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation 
des Hydrocarbures (SONATRACH) v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 613 (D. Mass. 1987). 
 Not everyone sees a need to give special treatment to 
international arbitration.57 Some countries have retreated from 
divergent treatment of domestic and international arbitration, due to 
concern that distinctions based on nationality might conflict with 
international commitments.58 
 There should be no mystery about the justification of a special 
status for international arbitration. The goals that lead business 
managers to insert arbitration clauses in cross-border contracts have 
a different focus than those that drive domestic arbitration.  
 All forms of arbitration usually implicate perceptions about cost, 
efficiency and expertise. International arbitration, however, involves 
greater emphasis on foreclosing the gamesmanship of parallel foreign 
litigation in each side’s home courts.59 Arbitration clauses in cross-
border contracts are usually prompted by apprehension about the real 
or imagined bias of foreign judicial proceedings.60 When a dispute has 
                                                                                                                       
In deciding that the federal arbitration laws prevailed over the Bankruptcy Code, the 
court noted:  
It is important and necessary for the United States to hold its domiciliaries to 
their bargains and not allow them to escape their commercial obligations by 
ducking into statutory safe harbors. Rather, our country should take special 
pains to project those qualities of honesty and fairness which are essential 
parts of the traditional American character.  
Id. at 614. 
 57. No less a scholar than Michael Mustill once wrote that he had “never 
understood why international arbitration should be different in principle from any 
other kind of arbitration.” See Michael Mustill, Cedric Barclay Memorial Lecture, ARB. 
159, at 165 (Aug. 1992). 
 58. Under the now superseded 1979 English Arbitration Act, pre-dispute 
waiver of appeal on points of law was not allowed between or among residents and/or 
citizens of the United Kingdom. See generally English Arbitration Act, 44 Eliz. 21 
(1979) (Eng.). The 1996 Arbitration Act contained similar provisions, which never 
entered into force due to a perceived conflict with obligations within the European 
Union. See discussion of Philip Alexander Securities & Futures Ltd. v. Bamberger infra 
Section IV.B (interpreting Article 12 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (EC Treaty), as amended by the Single European Act, the Treaty on 
European Union (Maastricht) and the Treaty of Amsterdam). There have also been 
reports that France is reconsidering the current distinction between domestic and 
international arbitration. See discussion of debate in meeting of Comité français de 
l’arbitrage held on June 19, 2002, reported in 13 WORLD ARB’N & MED. REP. 266, at 266 
(October 2002). 
 59. For Americans, analogous concerns over neutral dispute resolution are 
expressed in the U.S. Constitution itself, which gives federal courts power over cases 
“between citizens of different states” on the assumption that a Massachusetts 
respondent facing an Alabama claimant (or vice versa) will feel more comfortable in 
federal court than before the other side’s state judges. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see 
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2002) (codifying such “diversity jurisdiction”). In a related connection, 
Alexander Hamilton argued that the “peace of the whole ought not to be left at the 
disposal of a part.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 11 (3d ed. 1996). 
 60. For analogous principle, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2003) (setting out that U.S. 
federal courts, under “diversity” jurisdiction, can remedy disputes between citizens of 
different states provided amount in dispute exceeds a certain threshold). 
 
contacts with multiple countries, the parties may seek a playing field 
that is more neutral (procedurally, politically, and linguistically) than 
national courts.61  
 Absent reliable arbitration, judicial proceedings might go 
forward in a foreign language and perhaps before a xenophobic judge 
in a country lacking a tradition of judicial independence.62 In an 
international contract, the value of a reliable dispute resolution 
clause may rise to a considerable percentage of the amount of the 
contract value.63 
 The special raison d’être of international arbitration means that 
the parties often place a premium on freedom from the type of judicial 
scrutiny that would impinge on procedural neutrality. For many 
wealth-creating transactions, the prospect of foreign court 
intervention will chill cross-border economic cooperation, causing 
productive transactions to falter or become more expensive.64 
Without predictability about applicable substantive and procedural 
norms, business managers may hesitate to consummate transactions 
or charge greater prices to cover the risk of uncertainty in the event 
of dispute.65 Although the perception of litigation bias against 
foreigners is sometimes more significant than the reality of prejudice, 
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 61. Occasionally national courts of third countries might fill this role. However, 
limits related to subject matter jurisdiction and forum non conveniens often make this 
option problematic as a practical matter. See generally WILLIAM W. PARK, 
INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION (1995).  
 62. Although a Massachusetts company might not relish having to go to court 
in Atlanta, relatively familiar procedural norms would still be applied in some variant 
of the English language. However, proceedings in Algiers would involve the tongue of 
Mohammed rather than Shakespeare, with local counsel required to advise on an 
unfamiliar code of civil procedure. Consequently, in such cases, the parties might 
choose ICC arbitration in Geneva, providing a greater sense of fairness ex ante 
(whatever the parties’ second thoughts after the dispute arises) than the vision of U.S. 
juries or Algerian judges. Dispute resolution could proceed in a mutually accessible 
country by a tribunal chaired by someone of a nationality different from the parties, in 
a common language and according to procedural principles that give neither side an 
unfair advantage. 
 63. For a charming illustration of this principle, see Emmanuel Gaillard, The 
Economic Value of an Arbitration Clause, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1999, at 3. Professor 
Gaillard posits a construction company owed $100 million by a foreign customer that 
refuses to pay. Id. Although the builder’s case is well founded, bias in host country 
courts causes the builder to settle for half the claimed amount. Id. Thus the economic 
value of a well drafted arbitration clause would be $50 million. Id. 
 64. On the effect of litigation risk aversion in international business, see 
generally William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Cooperation, 12 J. 
INT’L ARB. 99 (1995).  
 65. Greater risks require greater returns. To illustrate, imagine two potential 
investments, one in Country A presenting an opportunity for a large profit, but with a 
good chance that local courts will be biased against a foreign party, and another in 
Country B yielding a smaller profit, but with fair dispute resolution. Depending on how 
large the disparity between the expected returns, many risk-averse foreign merchants 
will choose the lower return coupled with the fairer legal system.  
the consequences will be the same in that some transactions will not 
go forward without a reliable alternative to judicial litigation.66  
 It is often difficult for Americans to understand how disagreeable 
our civil justice system appears to foreigners. A recent article by a 
German scholar referred to U.S. litigation as a “procedural monster” 
that is feared because of its “appetite, sharp teeth and 
capriciousness.”67  
 Since contracts do not enforce themselves, but need flesh and 
blood adjudicators, who interprets an international agreement has 
often been more significant than what the applicable law says about 
its construction. Large portions of international arbitration procedure 
can be explained as an attempt to maximize the legitimacy of a 
process detached from the normal sources of authority.68 
 The specificity of international transactions has led many 
countries to adopt separate statutes for international arbitration. 
Belgium,69 France,70 and Switzerland,71 as well as places that have 
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 66. A recent study found evidence that in federal civil actions in the United 
States, foreigners actually fare better than domestic parties, due in part to a fear of the 
American civil justice system that causes foreign litigants to continue to final judgment 
only when they have particularly strong cases. See Kevin Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1122 (1996) 
(analyzing cases decided from 1986-94). 
 67. Rolf Stürner, Why are Europeans Afraid to Litigate in the United States?, in 
CONFERENCE SERIES OF CENTRO DI STUDI E RICERCHE DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E 
STRANIERO 15 (M.J. Bonnell ed., 2001). Stürner, who teaches in Fribourg, Germany, 
examines discovery, juries, costs rules (with each side bearing its own legal costs), 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and direct service of process rather than through Hague 
Convention. See generally id.  
 68. For example, the practice of constituting an arbitral tribunal with each side 
making a nomination gives parties a measure of comfort that someone they trust will 
be on the inside to keep the adjudication honest. By contrast, for domestic transactions, 
the individuals who will decide cases are selected either by a government (in the case of 
judges) or a national arbitration institution that commands a measure of respectability 
among all the parties. Even an institution such as the ICC represents only a vague and 
shadowy presence for most American lawyers, and to those from developing countries 
the ICC may be perceived as tending to select arbitrators principally with European or 
North American backgrounds. 
 69. Currently the Belgian CODE JUDICIAIRE prohibits courts from hearing 
challenges to awards made in Belgium if neither party is a Belgian national or resident 
and the parties have explicitly excluded judicial review:  
Les parties peuvent, par une déclaration expresse dans la convention d’arbitrage 
ou par une convention ultérieure, exclure tout recours en annulation d’une 
sentence arbitrale lorsqu’aucune d’elles n’est soit une personne physique ayant la 
nationalité belge ou une résidence en Belgique, soit une personne morale ayant 
en Belgique son principal établissement ou y ayant une succursale. 
CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1717(4) (Belg.). 
 70. N.C.P.C. art. 1492-1505 (Fr.).  
 71. LOI FÉDÉRALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ/ BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER 
DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [LDIP] ch. 12 art. 176-95 (1989) (Switz.). See 
generally P. LALIVE ET AL., , LE DROIT DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL EN 
SUISSE (1989).  
 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law72 such as Canada,73 
Scotland74 and Hong Kong,75 all provide a more laissez-faire 
framework for international arbitration. 
B. What Makes Arbitration International? 
 A different standard for monitoring arbitration of domestic and 
international transactions requires criteria to distinguish one from 
the other.76 Several criteria might be considered, including the 
nature of the transaction as well as the parties’ residences77 and/or 
citizenship.78 The UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law combines 
multiple tests, bringing within its scope arbitrations in which (i) 
parties have places of business in different countries, (ii) the place of 
contract performance or the place of arbitration is outside the parties’ 
home country, or (iii) the parties opt to treat the proceedings as 
international.79 
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 72. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, adopted by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, June 21, 1985. See generally IGOR I. KAVASS & ARNO LIIVAK, 
UNCITRAL: MODEL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 70 (vol. 2, 1985). 
 73. The UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law has been adopted on the federal 
level as well as by all Provinces. See generally Henri Alvarez, The Role of Arbitration in 
Canada - New Perspectives, 21 U.B.C. L. REV. 247 (1987); Henri Alvarez, Judicial 
Intervention and Review under the International Commercial Arbitration Act, in THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW IN CANADA (R.K. Paterson & B.J.Thompson eds., 1987).  
 74. See Law Reform (Misc. Provision) (Scotland Act), 38 Eliz. 2, c. 40, § 66 
(1990) (Eng.) (enacting the UNCITRAL Model Law for international transactions, and 
also gives parties to a non-international agreement the right to bring their arbitration 
within the Act). The UNCITRAL Model Law, as adopted in Scotland, is contained in 
Schedule 7 to the 1990 Act. See generally John Murray (Lord Dervaird), Scotland and 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, 6 ARB. INT’L 63 (1990). Article 34(2)(a)(v) of the Scottish 
version of the Model Law adds “corruption, fraud and bribery” as grounds for vacatur. 
Law Reform (Misc. Provisions) (Scotland Act), 51 Eliz. 2, Sch. 7, art. 34(2)(a)(v) (1992) 
(Eng.). 
 75. Hong Kong adopted almost verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law in its 
1990 Arbitration Ordinance, Hong Kong Laws Chapter 341. See Arbitration Ordinance, 
Hong Kong Laws Ch. 341 Part IIA §§ 34A-34D (1990) (P.R.C.). See generally NEIL 
KAPLAN, JILL SPRUCE & MICHAEL MOSER, HONG KONG AND CHINESE ARBITRATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (1994). Although the People’s Republic of China has resumed 
sovereignty over the former British colony, Hong Kong remains a “Special 
Administrative Region” with many of its own laws, including a separate arbitration 
ordinance. See BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 4, 1990) (in effect for a fifty-year transitional 
period ending June 30, 2047). 
 76. On characterization in conflict-of-laws, see Bernard Audit, Qualification et 
Droit International Privé, 18 DROITS: REVUE FRANÇAISE DE THEORIE JURIDIQUE 55 
(1993). 
 77. See, e.g., LDIP art. 176, 192 (1989) (Switz.).  
 78. For example, the United States excludes from the New York Convention 
contracts arising from relationships entirely between citizens of the United States, 
unless involving property, performance or enforcement abroad. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2002). 
 79. UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, § 1(3). 
 A party-oriented test to define international arbitration, which 
looks to the residence of the litigants, has been adopted in Belgium80 
and Switzerland.81 A less mechanical approach, asking whether a 
transaction implicates international commerce, has been adopted by 
the French.82 To the limited extent that the United States recognizes 
international arbitration’s specificity, a hybrid approach is taken.83 
 A residence-based test seems most sensible.84 The linguistic and 
procedural differences that justify a laissez-faire arbitration regime 
are more likely to arise when U.S. residents seek to avoid having 
foreigners haul them into court in Paris, Rio, or Shanghai, rather 
than when one U.S. citizen sues another in New York over goods 
and/or services destined for export. A residence-based test would also 
meet concerns expressed by some nations that a separate legal 
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 80. See CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1717 (Belg.) (making nationality as well as 
residence a criterion for application of the special international regime).  
 81. See LDIP art. 176 (1989) (Switz.) (applying the statutory provisions on 
international arbitration to arbitration if at least one of the parties had neither its 
domicile nor its habitual residence in Switzerland). For discussion of recent Swiss case 
law on the definition of international arbitration, see Gabrielle Kaufmann, When is a 
Swiss Arbitration International? JUSLETTER, Oct. 7, 2002, available at 
http://www.weblaw.ch/jusletter (last visited Sept. 16, 2003). Professor Kaufmann-
Kohler calls into question a decision of the Swiss Tribunal fédéral of June 24, 2002, in 
which the arbitrators had considered the relevant criterion to be the residence of the 
parties to the arbitration agreement. Id. The reviewing court held that what counted 
was the residence of the parties to the arbitral proceedings, thus ignoring contracting 
parties which did not participate in the arbitration. Id.; see also LDIP art. 192 (1989) 
(Switz.) (covering the right to opt out of any judicial review of awards if neither party is 
resident in Switzerland). 
 82. See N.C.P.C. art. 1492 (Fr.) (referring to disputes that “implicate 
international commerce”). For a recent case testing this definition in the context of a 
consumer contract (where a pre-dispute arbitration clause would normally not be 
valid), see Cour de cassation, May 21, 1997, Meglio v. Société V2000. Cass. 1e civ., May 
21, 1997, 1997 REV. ARB. 537 (note Gaillard); see also Cass. 1e civ., May 21, 1997, 1998 
REV. CRIT. DR. INT’L PRIVÉ 87 (note Heuzé). The Cour de cassation upheld the validity 
of an arbitration clause in an agreement for the purchase of a limited series Jaguar, 
finding that the contract implicated international commerce by virtue of a transfer of 
goods and funds between France and the United Kingdom. Id. 
 83. The United States excludes contracts between U.S. citizens from the scope 
of the New York Convention, which covers primarily foreign awards. 9. U.S.C. § 202 
(2003). However, an agreement between U.S. citizens will be deemed to fall under the 
Convention if the parties’ relationship “involves property located abroad, envisages 
performance or enforcement abroad or has some other reasonable relation with one or 
more foreign states.” Id.; see Lander v. MMP Invs., 107 F.3d 476, 478-80 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(in which the Convention was applied between two American companies in connection 
with their contract to distribute manufacturer’s shampoo products in Poland.) 
Moreover, the United States applies the New York Convention to non-domestic awards 
rendered in the United States if the award was made within the legal framework of 
another country (i.e. foreign law) or involving parties domiciled or having their 
principal place of business outside the United States. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 
710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).  
 84. As a matter of drafting, corporate entities should probably be considered 
residents if organized under the law of, or possessing a principal place of business in, 
the forum country. Thus, for example, a U.S. branch of a foreign corporation would be 
considered a United States resident, as would an alien individual present in the United 
States more than 183 days during any calendar year.  
 
framework for international arbitration conflicts with treaty 
prohibitions on nationality-based discrimination.85 
IV. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF AWARDS 
A. Statute, Treaty, and Public Policy  
 Judicial scrutiny of most awards made in the United States 
generally follows the lines provided by Chapter 1 of the FAA. By 
contrast, the New York Convention controls court review of foreign 
awards, which is to say decisions rendered abroad.86  
 As discussed earlier, things are a bit more complicated for 
awards made in the United States that have a direct nexus to 
international commerce. These arbitrations may give rise to an 
overlap between the judicial control allowed under the FAA for 
awards rendered in the United States and the New York Convention 
provisions applicable to awards “not considered as domestic.”87  
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 85. See Phillip Alexander Securities & Futures Ltd. v. Bamberger, Court of 
Appeal, reported in The Times, July 22, 1996 (losses in futures trading in an Anglo-
German transaction). Sections 85-87 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act (containing a 
special regime for domestic arbitration prohibiting pre-dispute waiver of appeal on 
points of English law) never entered into force due to a perceived conflict with TREATY 
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, as amended by the TREATY ON EUROPEAN 
UNION, which in Article 12 (former Article 6) provides that “any discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” Concern was expressed that provisions of 
the British consumer protection law would have protected British but not German 
customers, and that even a residence based distinction might have constituted 
disguised nationality-based discrimination. The Secretary of State was given the right 
to order repeal or amendment of the protective régime (Act § 88) which was exercised 
in Section 3, Statutory Instrument 3146, providing that the Act would come into force 
“except sections 85 to 87” (relating to domestic arbitration). The English decision to 
forego a separate international regime is a bit puzzling, since the British could have 
dodged the EU bullet with something like the French test for characterizing 
arbitration, which looks to see whether the arbitration “implicates international 
commerce.” Belgium, thus far, seems to have gotten away with using nationality as one 
of the tests for its special regime allowing exclusion of all court review. See CODE 
JUDICIAIRE art. 1717(4) (Belg.).  
 86. New York Convention art. I(1). For example, courts in Boston would 
normally apply the Convention to an award made in Paris, but not to an award 
rendered in Chicago. See FAA Chapter 2. For Latin American countries, the Panama 
Convention applies many of the same principles. See FAA Chapter 3. When the 
requirements for both the Panama and New York Conventions are met, the former 
applies if a majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of states 
that have ratified or acceded to that Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 305 (2002). 
 87. New York Convention art. I (3) and 9 U.S.C. § 202, discussed supra notes 
25-26 and accompanying text. For cases interpreting the reference in Article I to 
awards “not considered as domestic,” see Lander Co. v. MMP, Invs., 107 F.3d 476, 478-
80 (1997) (describing an arbitration between two American companies selling shampoo 
in Poland), Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(arbitration between Swiss company and Norwegian ship owner). 
 While such non-domestic awards are explicitly subject to 
standards for confirmation enumerated in the New York Convention, 
nothing is said about any special grounds for their vacatur. This 
problematic disjunction between grounds to confirm and grounds to 
vacate88 is particularly troublesome since in practice awards will be 
subject to simultaneous motions to vacate (by the loser) and to 
confirm (by the winner). Consequently, any modification to the FAA 
might coordinate the vacatur and confirmation principles applied to 
“non-domestic” awards.89 
 At first blush it may seem puzzling that courts intervene at all in 
a process designed to be private. Ironically, it is precisely the business 
managers’ desire to have their disputes settled out of court that leads 
judges to play a role in international arbitration. When a litigant 
resists implementation of the bargain to arbitrate, courts must decide 
whether to defer to the parties’ contract. 
 Arbitration proceeds in the shadow of government power at 
several stages. The validity of an arbitration clause may first be 
questioned in a motion to compel arbitration or to stay judicial 
proceedings. During the arbitration itself, litigants sometimes 
request interim measures such as enforcement of subpoenas or pre-
award attachment of assets.  
 Perhaps the most critical point comes in the arbitration 
endgame, after the arbitrator’s decision, when the loser may resist 
award recognition. As one form of risk management, judicial review 
attempts to resolve tensions between the rival goals of award finality 
(necessary to make arbitration reliable) and procedural fairness 
(without which aberrant decisions would sap community confidence 
in the process). Annulment of aberrant awards also has an in 
terrorem effect that helps to reduce problems at earlier stages, since 
most arbitrators are understandably averse to the public rebuke 
inherent in having their awards vacated.  
 If an award is set aside where made, it not only becomes 
unenforceable at the situs but also may lose its treaty-based validity 
abroad.90 Judicial review is vital when the winner seeks to attach the 
loser’s assets or to block competing lawsuits.91 
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 88. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2002). (incorporated by reference into implementation of 
the Panama Convention). In addition, the FAA extends to three years the time for 
confirmation of “non-domestic” awards, while confirmation of domestic awards must be 
made within one year from the date of the award. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2002).  
 89. See id. 
 90. It may be that under national law an award is enforceable regardless of the 
absence of any treaty mandate. See generally Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Egypt, 939 F. 
Supp. 907, 911 (D.D.C. 1996); see also New York Convention art. V(1)(e), discussed in 
William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L ARB. 
805 (1999); Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration 
Awards: An Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 451 (2000). 
 91. See generally William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International 
Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L ARB. 805 (1999). 
 
 At all stages of the arbitral process, questions may arise about 
the “subject matter arbitrability” of cases that affect sensitive public 
norms and delicate choice-of-law issues.92 However, a long line of 
federal court decisions has distinguished domestic and international 
arbitrability, recognizing a hierarchy of values that make it 
inappropriate in international arbitration to impose flat prohibitions 
on arbitration of public law questions such as antitrust and securities 
regulation.93 Nevertheless, American courts have indicated that they 
will refuse to recognize arbitration clauses that operate in tandem 
with choice-of-law provisions to constitute a “prospective waiver” of 
otherwise applicable mandatory norms.94 
 The Convention’s practical effectiveness can also depend on the 
idiosyncrasies of national procedural law. The New York Arbitration 
Convention requires enforcement of awards “in accordance with the 
rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon.”95 
Recent Court of Appeals decisions have shown how troublesome 
national law can be, citing the above-quoted language (“procedure of 
the territory where the award is relied upon”) as an escape hatch 
from treaty enforcement obligations. On forum non conveniens 
grounds, one court has refused to confirm an award rendered in 
Moscow,96 while another has denied recognition to a London award 
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 92. Article V(2) of the New York Convention permits courts to refuse award 
recognition sua sponte if they find “the subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration” or “the recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the [recognition forum’s] public policy.” 
 93. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, 637-38 (1985) and 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see also Sonatrach v. Distrigas 
Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 612 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). See generally William W. Park, Private 
Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding Scope of International 
Arbitration, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 629 (1986); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from 
Mandatory Rules: Privatization of Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 
(1999). The decision in Mitsubishi presumed that American courts could control 
aberrant arbitral decisions by taking a second look at awards to insure that public 
policy concerns were properly addressed. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638. This approach is 
not without its problems. In an international context, assets outside the United States 
may be available to enforce awards, obviating any need for the assistance of American 
courts. Moreover, in arbitrations outside the United States arbitrators will 
understandably fear that departure from the parties’ choice of law will increase the 
risk of award vacatur at the situs on the basis of excess of arbitral authority. 
 94. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637. 
 95. New York Convention art. III.  
 96. See Monégasque de Reassurances SAM v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 158 
F. Supp. 2d 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 311 F.3d 488 (2002). The award was 
rendered in connection with a gas pipeline in Ukraine. Id. A reinsurance company 
based in Monaco (subrogated to the rights of a Russian company) sought recognition of 
an $88 million award against the defaulting party. Id. Complicating factors in the case 
include the fact that one respondent (Ukraine) was both a sovereign state and a non-
signatory to the arbitration agreement. Id. While theories exist under which non-
signatories of arbitration clauses may be bound (such as agency, alter ego and 
estoppel), the Second Circuit noted that application of any of these principles would 
on the basis that “minimum contacts” with the United States were 
absent, thus raising U.S. Constitutional notions of “due process” and 
personal jurisdiction.97  
 The decisions are unsettling to many observers who read the 
Convention reference to national law as including only minor matters 
such as filing requirements and fees.98 Significantly, however, the 
decisions note an absence of identifiable property within the 
jurisdiction,99 thus reducing the effect of the cases to situations in 
which a winning respondent seeks award recognition in order to 
preclude competing lawsuits.  
B. Why, When, and How Courts Review Awards 
1. Alternatives 
                                                                                                                       
require extensive discovery of documents outside the United States, and most probably 
a trial. Monegasque, 311 F.3d at 500.  
 97. See Glencore Grain Rotterdam BV v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain, 284 F.3d 
1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing London Rice Brokers’ Ass’n arbitration) (stating 
that sales in California not sufficient to establish jurisdiction over transaction 
involving a Dutch grain trader and an Indian rice exporter); see also CNA Reinsurance 
Co. v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 2001 WL 648948 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The Third and Fourth 
Circuits reached similar results in cases bearing the same name relating to attempts to 
enforce the same award, arising out of contracts between a Guernsey metals trader and 
a Russian mining company. See Base Metal Trading v. OJSC Novokuznetsky 
Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 215-16 (4th Cir. 2002); Base Metal Trading v. OJSC 
Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 2002 WL 31002609 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding a lack of 
the “minimum contacts” with the United States required by due process).  
 98. To apply an admittedly imperfect analogy, while in the United States local 
law generally determines grounds for revocation of arbitration clauses, a state may not 
impose legal obstacles that sabotage the pro-arbitration policy of the Federal 
Arbitration Act. See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996); Allied-
Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1 (1984); Securities Industry Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1114 (1st Cir. 
1989).  
 99. In Monégasque de Reassurances, the district court stated that “it is not 
clear that Naftogaz has any assets in the United States from which Monde Re could 
recover.” Monégasque de Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 
158 F. Supp. 2d at 386. The Second Circuit stated that “the jurisdiction provided by the 
[New York] Convention is the only link between the parties and the United States.” 
311 F.3d at 499. In Glencore the Ninth Circuit stated that “Glencore fails to identify 
any property owned by Shivnath Rai in the forum against which Glencore could 
attempt to enforce its award.” Glencore, 284 F.3d at 1128. The presence of property 
would seem relevant in light of the decision in Shaffer making a distinction between 
jurisdiction on the merits of a dispute and jurisdiction to enforce judgment. See Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 186 n.36 (1977): 
Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the 
defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in 
allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has 
property, whether or not the State would have jurisdiction to determine the 
existence of the debt as an original matter. 
For a subsequent analysis of Shaffer, see generally Burnham v. Superior Court of 
California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), discussing California jurisdiction to serve a New 
Jersey resident in the context of a divorce petition. 
 
 As in any reform, overhaul of arbitration rules and statutes 
implicates a process of comparing alternatives. Most countries permit 
judges to vacate decisions of perverse arbitrators who have ignored 
basic procedural fairness or overreached their authority.100 Another 
paradigm also gives a right to appeal an award’s substantive legal 
merits.101 Some countries allow a choice between these alternatives, 
with default rules that require litigants either to “opt in”102 or to “opt 
out”103 of appeal on the substantive merits of the case104 or permit 
hybrid grounds for vacatur that imply something beyond a simple 
mistake.105  
2. Situs Review 
 Public scrutiny of arbitration is inevitable at the time of award 
recognition. Judges can hardly ignore the basic fairness of an arbitral 
proceeding when asked to give an award res judicata effect by seizing 
assets or staying a court action. Less evident, in an international 
context, is why the arbitral situs should necessarily monitor an award 
prior to an enforcement action. Often an arbitral situs is chosen only 
for geographical convenience or procedural neutrality,106 and the 
dispute involves neither property nor activity at the place of 
arbitration. In such circumstances, the arbitral situs might dispense 
with any pre-enforcement review of the arbitrator’s decision.  
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 100. See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW art. 34; N.C.P.C. art. 1502 (Fr.); ZPO art. 
1059 (F.R.G.); LDIP art. 190 (1989) (Switz.); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). While the Swiss 
statute does not enumerate bias explicitly, other bases for vacatur (such as lack of due 
process or violation of public policy) serve to address arbitrator prejudice. In some cases 
“public policy” is added as a ground for vacatur. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, art. 
34(2)(b)(ii); N.C.P.C. art. 1502(5) (Fr.); ZPO, art. 1059(2)2.b (F.R.G.); LDIP art. 
190(2)(e) (1989) (Switz.). See generally William W. Park, Why Courts Review Arbitral 
Awards, in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT UND STREITERLEDIGUNG IM 21. 
JAHRHUNDERT: LIBER AMICORUM KARL-HEINZ BÖCKSTIEGEL 595 (R. Briner et al., eds., 
2001). 
 101. See Arbitration Act, 1996, § 69 (Eng.); William W. Park, The Interaction of 
Courts and Arbitrators in England, 1 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 54 (1998), reprinted in 13 INT’L 
ARB. REP. 21 (June 1998). 
 102. See discussion of Harris v. Parker and related cases, discussed infra note 
145 and accompanying text.  
 103. See Arbitration Act, 1996, § 69 (Eng.) (permitting exclusion of appeal on 
questions of English law).  
 104. See discussion of Switzerland’s arbitration regime infra notes 239-44 and 
accompanying text. 
 105. See discussion of vacatur for “manifest disregard of the law” supra notes 32-
39 and accompanying text. Moreover, Swiss cantonal law has long allowed awards to 
be set aside for “arbitrariness,” defined to include “evident violations of law or equity.” 
See CONCORDAT SUISSE SUR L’ARBITRAGE art. 36(f) (1969) (Switz.). 
 106. See also W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION 113, 116 (1992) (distinguishing between “primary” 
and “secondary” control). See generally W. LAURENCE CRAIG, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION, 28.03 (3d ed. 2000).  
 The proper extent of judicial review of awards at the arbitral 
situs has been the subject of lively debate between those favoring a 
“delocalized” regime with little or no judicial scrutiny of international 
arbitration and advocates of a more territorial approach that gives 
greater leeway to courts to monitor arbitrations conducted within 
their jurisdiction.107 Some countries have deliberately reduced the 
impact of local law on international arbitration.108  
 The trend toward delocalization does not mean that courts at the 
place of arbitration should never review awards. The prospect of no 
court scrutiny at the arbitral situs is almost certain to affect 
adversely the victims of defective arbitrations, the health of 
international arbitration, and in some cases the interests of the 
reviewing state itself.109 After the fact, of course, the winner will 
reject extensive court intervention, while the loser will see appeal as 
a less appalling prospect. However, at the time the arbitration clause 
is signed, before the results of any arbitration are known, the 
existence of basic procedural safeguards will enhance rather than 
diminish the arbitral process.  
3. Efficiency 
 Although no system of judicial review will be completely foolproof 
(fools being quite ingenious), common sense suggests that arbitrator 
misconduct is less likely when questionable behavior is subject to 
public scrutiny relatively soon after the proceedings.110 Situs review 
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 107. See also William W. Park, Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial 
Arbitration, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 22-47 (1983); William W. Park, Duty and 
Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L LAW 805, 808-13 (1999); Jan 
Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration, 32 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 53, 53-61 (1983); cf. Philippe Fouchard, La Portée internationale de l’annulation de 
la sentence arbitrale dans son pays d’origine, 1997 REV. ARB. 329, 351-52 (1997); 
Francis Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (P. 
Sanders ed., 1967), reprinted in 2 ARB. INT’L 241, 254-61 (1986).  
 108. Until 1989, for example, arbitrations in Switzerland were subject to the 
Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat, which in Article 24 directs arbitrators to fill 
procedural gaps by reference to Swiss federal law. By contrast, analogous provisions of 
the current Swiss international arbitration law contain no such rule, but permit the 
parties to agree upon the rules of procedure, either directly or by reference to the rules 
of an arbitration institution or a national procedural law of their choice.  
 109. This conclusion assumes an honest judiciary. An absence of situs review 
might be preferable in parts of the world lacking a tradition of judicial independence, 
where the business community may prefer to take its chances with potential arbitrator 
misbehavior as the lesser of two evils. In practice, the risk of corrupt judges is best 
addressed through the market, by the parties’ informed choice of the arbitral situs.  
 110. For example, the prospect of judicial review is likely to sensitize arbitrators 
to the potential benefit in allowing testimony from a witness they might otherwise not 
wish to hear. Whether the expense of procedural fairness is justified will depend on the 
facts of each case. Every additional witness costs time and money. Equilibrium in 
judicial review requires constant sensitivity to the competing concerns of winners and 
losers. For divergent analyses of the effect of procedural safeguards on arbitration, 
compare generally Eric Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization of International 
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 647 (1999) with Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to 
 
usually occurs immediately after the award is rendered, when 
documents and witnesses are more readily available and recollections 
have not become stale. 
 By promoting confidence that arbitration will not be a lottery of 
erratic results, situs review also furthers respect for awards outside 
the country in which the arbitration occurs. Without a right to have 
procedurally unfair awards vacated at the situs, victims of procedural 
irregularity must prove an award’s illegitimate character de novo 
wherever it might be presented for recognition, running from country 
to country to oppose invalid decisions.111 For the defendant, this 
might mean greater difficulty in resisting asset attachment in 
multiple jurisdictions where property is located. The claimant would 
face the equally daunting task of showing that the defective award 
should not bar subsequent arbitral proceedings.112  
 Perhaps the best evidence of business community desire for court 
scrutiny at the arbitral situs lies in Belgium’s failed experiment in 
mandatory “non-review” of awards.113 Hoping that a completely 
laissez-faire system would attract arbitration, in 1985 Belgium 
eliminated all motions to vacate awards in disputes between foreign 
parties.114 Contrary to expectations, business managers turned out to 
be unimpressed by the new system.115 Consequently, in 1998 the 
Belgian legislature enacted a new statute that now leaves a safety 
net of judicial review as the default rule.116  
                                                                                                                       
Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: A Legal Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209 
(2000). 
 111. This concern lay at the heart of France’s international arbitration decree, 
promulgated after court decisions held that French judges lacked power to vacate 
awards made in international arbitrations. By allowing award annulment for 
procedural irregularity, excess of authority and violation of public policy, N.C.P.C. art. 
1502 (Fr.) now addresses fears that a complete absence of judicial control might lead 
foreign courts to hesitate to enforce French awards. Décret No. 81-500, May 12, 1981, 
1981 J. OFFICIEL RÉP. FRANÇAISE 1398-1406, in effect reversing Gen. Nat’l Maritime 
Transp. Co. v. Société Götaverken Arendal, Feb. 21, 1980, Cour d’appel de Paris, REV. 
ARB., 1980, 524 and AKSA v. Norsolor, Dec. 9, 1980, Cour d’appel de Paris, 1981 REV. 
ARB., 1981, 306; 20 I.L.M. 883. 
 112. See Hilmarton v. OTV, Cour de cassation, REV. ARB. June 10, 1997, 376 (an 
award vacated in Switzerland granted exequatur in France). For earlier decisions in 
the Hilmarton matter, see Cour d’appel de Paris, REV. ARB. 1993, 300, confirmed by 
Cour de cassation, REV. ARB. 1994, 327 (recognizing the vacated award) and Cour 
d’appel de Versailles, REV. ARB. 1995, 639 (upholding a decision by the Tribunal de 
grande instance de Nanterre recognizing a second award rendered after annulment of 
the award recognized earlier in France). 
 113. See discussion infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
 114. See CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1717(4) (Belg.) (as enacted in 1985, before 
amendment of May 19, 1998, effective August 17, 1998).  
 115. See Bernard Hanotiau & Guy Block, La loi du 19 mai 1998 modificant la 
législation belge relative à l’arbitrage, 16 ASA BULL. 528, 532 (1998). 
 116. So far there seems to be little reliable indication of how the business 
community has received this change, particularly in light of arbitration’s 
4. Vitality of National Substantive Law 
 In addition to efficiency arguments discussed above, some 
countries have also adopted merits review of awards to foster the 
development and stability of the forum’s substantive law. By their 
public nature, court cases often create behavioral rules to guide 
business conduct outside a particular dispute.117 Mandatory judicial 
review of awards on the legal merits of the case thus fertilizes legal 
development by creating a publicly available “legal capital” of new 
principles to meet changing commercial circumstances.118 Concerns 
about the development of substantive law once led England to restrict 
waiver of appeal on points of English law in so-called “special 
category” arbitrations related to insurance, commodity contracts and 
admiralty questions.119 While arbitration also creates precedent 
through reasoned awards published in sanitized form,120 such lex 
mercatoria is arguably less accessible than a court case given the 
duty of confidentiality covering much arbitration.121  
 The history of securities arbitration in the United States has 
illustrated the utility of such review. Following the United States 
Supreme Court decision to uphold the arbitrability of customer claims 
                                                                                                                       
confidentiality. Article 1717(4) of the Belgian Judicial Code provides that any challenge 
to awards must be made through an explicit statement.  
 117. Under the “public law model” of litigation, cases guide future transactions 
of non-litigants. See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False 
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. 
REV. 1273, 1293-98 (1995). For discussion of analogous notions in connection to 
resolution of disputes arising from internet sales, see Michael Schneider & Christopher 
Kuner, Dispute Resolution in International Electronic Commerce, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 5 
(Sept. 1997) at http://www.disputes.net/cyberweek2001/intereleccomerce.htm (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2003). 
 118. In the United States, one influential proponent of this perspective argues 
that the law should discourage settlement as well as arbitration agreements. See Owen 
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984).  
 119. See Arbitration Act, 1979 § 4(1) (Eng.) (abrogated in 1996) (prohibiting 
exclusion of appeal on the merits of a case unless either the contract was explicitly 
subject to a legal system other than English law or the exclusion was concluded after 
the arbitration began). The drafters of England’s 1979 Arbitration Act operated on the 
assumption that the law of England should have preeminence in the restricted areas, 
to be maintained by new judgments covering new commercial controversies. 
“Commodity contract” was defined to include agreements for the sale of goods on 
English commodity exchanges. Maritime questions were defined as claims falling 
within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court. See generally William W. Park, 
Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration, 21 HARV. INT’L L.J. 87, 
100 (1980).  
 120. See generally 1 ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1971-85 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves 
Derains eds., 1990); 2 ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986-90 (Sigvard Jarvin et al. eds., 1994); 
3 ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1991-95 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez et al. eds., 1997). 
 121. See generally William W. Park, Control Mechanisms in the Development of 
a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 143, 165-66 
(Thomas Carbonneau ed., 1990) (rev. 1998). 
 
against brokerage houses,122 there has been a marked decrease in 
court decisions addressing broker-customer relations, resulting in a 
freeze of the relevant law.123  
 On balance, merits review would clearly not be appropriate for 
an international arbitration statute, at least not as a default rule. In 
international arbitration, the parties’ interest in procedural 
neutrality would almost always outweigh any benefits derived from 
using commercial disputes to develop substantive law.124 Moreover, 
the argument for substantive merits review is strongest when the law 
of the situs governs the relevant contract, which is much less 
frequent in international rather than domestic contracts.125  
V. THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS: POSSIBLE CONTOURS OF NEW FAA 
PROVISIONS  
A. Optimal Judicial Review for International Arbitration 
 An optimum legal framework for international arbitration would 
limit court scrutiny to narrow review standards, regardless of 
whatever judicially-administered anti-abuse measures might be 
appropriate for domestic cases. The best default rule for judicial 
review of international awards gives losers a right to challenge 
awards only for excess of authority and basic procedural unfairness 
(bias or denial of an opportunity to present one’s case), but not the 
merits of the case.126  
 If the substance of a dispute could regularly be second-guessed 
by judges, arbitration would become no more than foreplay to 
litigation. A century and a half ago, the U.S. Supreme Court refused 
to allow an award vacatur for mistake of fact or law, noting that to do 
so “would make an award the commencement, not the end, of 
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 122. See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1987) 
(fraud claims under Exchange Act § 10b and Rule 10b-5); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act § 12(2) claims). 
 123. See Alan R. Palmiter, SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.2.5, at 366 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 124. The negative effect of the law being developed through awards rather than 
cases is more worrisome with respect to consumer transactions, where awards 
traditionally do not state reasons (at least in the United States) and are not published.  
 125. While the law of the arbitral situs does sometimes govern cross-border 
contracts, more often the dispute resolution clause represents a compromise, with 
language clauses such as “Arbitration in Geneva under English law” providing for 
arbitration in one country under the law of another. 
 126. As discussed infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text, proposal of the 
“fairness” model for judicial scrutiny of awards as a default rule does not mean that 
“merits review” should not be added on an optional basis. 
litigation.”127 On occasion this may result in what the Second Circuit 
once called “looser approximations” of rights than those available in 
court.128  
 Limited review, however, does not mean no review at all. Few 
commercial actors would want to buy into a system with no prospect 
for rectifying gross procedural unfairness. In agreeing to arbitrate, 
business managers generally assume the risk that arbitrators may 
“get it wrong” on the substance of the dispute but do not bargain for 
denial of fundamental due process. When one side regrets its bargain 
to arbitrate after the award is rendered, courts should maintain a 
relatively hands-off approach that balances the interests of winners 
and losers.129 Normally, judicial intervention is justified only to 
promote the basic integrity of the process and the arbitrators’ respect 
for the contours of their mission.130 
 A statute for international arbitration should exclude consumer 
and employment contracts, at least below certain statutorily defined 
limits.131 Such a “carve out” would reduce the type of conflict that has 
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 127. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855). In Burchell, a New York 
merchant succeeded in ruining the business of an Illinois store owner through 
oppressive lawsuits, and by having the store owner arrested on charges of dishonesty 
and perjury. To resolve the differences between them, the parties agreed to arbitration 
(called “arbitrament” in the agreement) by a three member panel that awarded 
damages which effectively wiped away the debt of the ill-treated Illinoisan. In 
reversing a circuit court vacatur of the award, the Supreme Court provided a succinct 
précis of the proper scope of judicial review in arbitration:  
If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the 
arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not 
set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a 
substitution of the judgment of the chancellor [the judiciary] in place of the 
judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, 
not the end, of litigation. 
Id. 
 128. Am. Almond Prods. v. Consol. Pecan Sales, 144 F. 2d 448, 451 (2d. Cir. 
1944) (Hand, J.) (confirming an award for breach of contract in the sale of pecans 
where arbitrators had awarded damages even without evidence on market price).  
 129. A dissent by Justice Holmes commented that “[t]he most enlightened 
judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the 
ground for interference is very clear.” Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 
U.S. 373, 386 (1911). 
 130. The text of the law, of course, must be read in the context of its application. 
Even a statute that allows challenge only for defects related to procedural regularity 
may allow wiggle room for an overzealous judge to examine a dispute’s legal merits 
under the guise of correcting arbitrator excess of authority. For an English perspective 
on the relationship between error of law and excess of jurisdiction, see ALFRED T. 
DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW 74 (1979) (“Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in 
law it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void.”). See also 
Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School, 3 W.L.R. 736, 743 (Eng. C.A. 
1978) (“The distinction between an error which entails absence of jurisdiction and an 
error made within jurisdiction is [so] fine . . . that it is rapidly being eroded.”). 
 131. The statute might also exclude agreements with small businesses. 
However, as Rudyard Kipling might have written, this question involves other stories 
for another day. For the time being it might be placed in a box of thoughts labeled 
“awaiting further light.” 
 
sometimes arisen when international arbitration statutes were not 
clear about the scope of their coverage.132  
 The UNCITRAL Model Law might serve as a useful starting 
point for developing grounds for judicial review of awards in an 
international dispute,133 subject to several modifications. Suggested 
language for a new FAA Chapter is set forth in the Appendix, 
incorporating appropriate portions of the Model Law. 
 First, vacatur on grounds of “public policy” remains highly 
problematic, principally because this chameleon-like concept risks 
misapplication when refracted through parochial cultural lenses.134 
While public policy analysis is unavoidable when judges seize 
property, such a malleable notion may not be necessary when 
enforcement is not requested.135 By contrast, procedural defects such 
as excess of authority and denial of the right to be heard, being more 
universal in nature, lend themselves less to disruptive application.136 
 Admittedly, some public policy violations will call for judicial 
action. If an award rendered in Boston grants damages for the sale of 
illegal arms to a terrorist organization, a court in Massachusetts 
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 132. See Meglio v. Société V2000, Cour de cassation, 1997 REV. ARB. 537 (note E. 
Gaillard); 1998 REV. CRIT. DR. INT’L PRIVÉ 87 (note V. Heuzé) (holding that French 
resident’s purchase of limited series Jaguar escaped restrictions on consumer 
arbitration). 
 133. Article 34 of the Model Law allows award vacatur for (i) invalidity of the 
agreement, (ii) lack of proper notice, (iii) excess of arbitral jurisdiction, (iv) irregular 
composition of the arbitral tribunal, (v) non-arbitrable subject-matter and (vi) conflict 
with public policy.  
 134. See, e.g., Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 
484 F. Supp. 1063, 1068-69 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (vacating award that applied French 
interest rate to international contract).  
 135. If German and Italian companies choose New York to arbitrate a dispute 
that has no effect in the United States, it might be best to leave to European judges the 
task of deciding whether the award is compatible with whatever public policy might be 
represented by usury laws or currency controls.  
 136. Other than when raised before the arbitral tribunal itself, public policy may 
be considered by courts not only when asked to vacate, confirm or recognize an award, 
but also when asked to enforce an agreement to arbitrate. In the last of these contests 
public policy is usually discussed as “subject matter arbitrability.” For two recent 
attempts in England to address public policy in the context of international commercial 
arbitration, see Westacre Investments v. Jugoimport, 1999 Q.B. 740 (Eng.), aff’g Q.B., 
December 19, 1997, 3 W.L.R. 770 (Eng.) and Soleimany v. Soleimany, C.A., 3 W.L.R. 
811 (1998) (Eng.). See also Homayoon Arfazadeh, L’ordre public du fond et l’annulation 
des sentences arbitrales internationales en Suisse, REV. SUISSE DR. INT. & DR. EUROPÉEN 
223 (1995). See generally Audley Sheppard & Nagla Nassar, Co-Rapporteurs, Final 
Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, in 
INT’L LAW ASS’N, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW DELHI CONFERENCE (2002), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/pdf/int%international%20commercial%20arbitration/international%20commerci
al%20arbitration%202002.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2003). The report states that 
award non-recognition may be justified for violation of “international public policy” 
(emphasis added), which is described in the negative as something other than policy 
“common to many States” and as “narrower in scope than domestic public policy.” Id. 
would have a hard time resisting vacatur of the decision.137 The issue 
is not so much the existence of a properly-conceived escape hatch but 
the temptation to invoke the concept abusively on parochial grounds.  
 One option might be to adopt explicitly the French distinction 
between public policy applicable to domestic and international 
cases.138 The latter concept, referred to as international public policy, 
would be constituted not by any supra-national norms, but rather by 
the policy applied by national courts to cross-border transactions with 
no direct impact on the forum.  
 Second, arbitrator bias and corruption should be included 
explicitly as grounds for annulment. The Model Law contains no 
reference to annulment for partiality, and thus public policy must be 
pressed into service to deal with defective awards rendered by biased 
arbitrators. A direct approach to the problem would be superior. 
Sensibly, Scotland’s adoption of the Model Law contains special 
provisions in this regard.139 
 Finally, litigants might be given an explicit statutory option to 
contract into review on the legal and factual merits of the dispute. On 
exclusion, American courts have traditionally taken the position that 
parties may not dispense with the minimum standard of review 
provided by the FAA.140 However, circuits are divided on whether 
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 137. Similarly, a U.S. judge might vacate an award implementing religious or 
racial discrimination even if allowed under the applicable foreign law. 
 138. See N.C.P.C. art. 1502(5) (Fr.). While both international and domestic 
public policy are creatures of French courts, the latter addresses policies relevant only 
in an internal context. The former implicates cross-border rather than purely French 
interests. Thus an international commercial dispute may be arbitrable even though the 
principal contract from which it arises violates French domestic public policy. 
Examples of violations of international public policy include procedural fraud 
(falsifying documents) and improper extension of time limits for rendering an award. 
See also BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ § 302 (1991) (suggesting that a 
better terminology might be “public policy in the sense of private international law” 
(ordre public au sense du droit international privé)). See generally HENRI BATIFFOL & 
PAUL LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ § 363 (8th ed. 1993).  
 139. See Law Reform (Misc. Provision) (Scotland Act), 1990, c.40, schedule 7, 
art. 34(2)(a)(v) (Eng.) (allowing vacatur if an award “was procured by fraud, bribery or 
corruption”). 
 140. See, e.g., Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57 (2003) (holding that a 
federal court is not deprived if the power to review an award for “manifest disregard of 
law” because the parties have provided that the award “shall not be subject to any type 
of review or appeal whatsoever”).  See also M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH, 87 F.3d 
844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that contract terms purporting to waive judicial 
review “merely reflect a contractual intent that the issues joined and resolved in the 
arbitration may not be tried de novo in any court”). Only one American decision has 
suggested (in ill-reasoned dictum) that there exists a right to discard the minimum 
grounds for vacatur under the FAA. See Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 
F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (suggesting that parties could “opt out of the FAA’s off-the-
rack vacatur standards”). Surprisingly, the court cited cases (Lapine and its progeny) 
relating not to exclusion of review, but to expansion of court scrutiny. Courts in France 
have taken a similar approach. Attempts to waive N.C.P.C. art. 1504 were dismissed in 
Diseno v. Société Mendes, Cour d’Appel de Paris, Oct. 24, 1994, 1995 REV. ARB. 263. 
See generally PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, 
TRAITÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL § 1597, at 931 nn.142-46 (1996). 
 
parties to an arbitration clause can by contract expand the judicial 
review function.141 Some allow expansion,142 while others hold that 
the FAA’s grounds for court scrutiny constitute a ceiling as well as a 
floor.143  
 While some commentators fear that to allow expansion of judicial 
review would change the character of arbitration, creditable 
arguments exist in favor of freedom of contract on the matter. At 
least as between sophisticated parties to an international contract, 
the right to elect merits review would seem almost a corollary of the 
right to elect courts. The wisdom of providing for judicial review in a 
given case is a question quite different from whether the right should 
be available.144  
 Concerning the parties’ ability to lower the judicial review 
standards by excluding all court scrutiny at the situs, the right rule is 
less certain. When all parties are from outside the United States the 
chances of the award affecting American interests are slim, which 
would favor allowing litigants the liberty to eliminate the possibility 
of vacatur where the award is rendered. However, an award’s 
international currency is likely to be enhanced by some minimum 
review at the situs, which supports an argument for American courts 
to maintain some power to scrutinize the award for conformity with 
basic procedural fairness and public policy of an international nature. 
 From a treaty perspective, divergent standards for international 
and domestic cases would be entirely consonant with American 
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 141. See generally Alan Scott Rau, Arbitrability and Judicial Review: A Brief 
Rejoinder, 13 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 71 (Mar. 2002); Victoria Holstein, Co-opting the 
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Through Contract, 12 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 
276 (Nov. 2001); Christopher R. Drahozal, Standards for Judicial Review of Arbitral 
Awards in the United States: Mandatory Rules or Default Rules?, 16 INT’L ARB. REP. 27 
(Sept. 2001); William H. Knull & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International 
Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 531, 545-47 
(2000); Andreas Lowenfeld, Can Arbitration Coexist With Judicial Review?, 3 ADR 
CURRENTS 1 (Sept. 1998); Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 246-56 (1997). 
 142. See Harris v. Parker College of Chiropractic, 286 F. 3d 790, 793-94 (5th Cir. 
2002); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 262 (4th Cir. 1997); Gateway 
Techs. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995); New England 
Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 62-64 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 143. See Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501, 
1505 (7th Cir. 1995); Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential Bache Trade Servs., 391 F3d 987 (9th 
Cir. 2003), overruling en banc Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 
(1997); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001).  
 144. Often the advisability of a merits review clause will be evaluated 
retroactively, and will depend on whether a party has won or lost the arbitration. One 
person’s delay is another’s due process. In Kyocera v. Prudential-Bache, the award 
went up to the Court of Appeals again with regard to substantive questions that 
included inter alia seller’s knowledge that a contract term had been incorporated into 
the final agreement, entitlement to rescission, the effect of insolvency and evidence for 
lost profits. See Kyocera, 299 F.3d 769, 773-76 (9th Cir. 2002).  
commitments to trading partners.145 The New York Arbitration 
Convention requires recognition of foreign awards on the same 
footing as domestic ones146 but always subject to the condition that 
awards vacated at the arbitral situs lose presumptive validity under 
the treaty’s enforcement scheme.147 The Convention leaves each 
country free to establish its own grounds for vacating awards made 
within its territory.148 A national arbitration statute may impose 
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 145. At least one country has enacted legislation providing that an award 
vacated where rendered may lose its enforceability, even if the vacatur occurs after 
recognition. See ZPO, § 1061, No. 3 (F.R.G.) (Wird der Schiedsspruch, nachdem er für 
vollstreckbar erklärt worden ist, im Ausland aufgehoben, so kann die Aufhebung der 
Vollstreckbarerklärung beantragt werden.). 
 146. New York Convention art. III. In some cases this deference is conditioned 
on a principle of territorial reciprocity, by which foreign awards are enforced only if 
rendered in another Convention country. See art. I(3). Thus the winner of an 
arbitration in Iran (which to date has not adhered to the Convention) could not use the 
Convention to enforce its award in the United States, which has taken the reciprocity 
reservation to the Convention’s application. 
 147. Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention permits recognition and 
enforcement to be denied to awards set aside in the country where made. The treaty’s 
French text lends itself to a more forceful interpretation, providing that “recognition 
and enforcement will not be refused unless the award . . . was annulled where 
rendered” (“La reconnaissance et l’exécution de la sentence ne seront refusées que si la 
sentence . . . a été annulée ou suspendue”). The Chinese, Russian and Spanish versions 
seem to comport with the permissive English. Thus vacatur at the arbitral situs will 
not in all cases uproot the defective decision. Some judges have disregarded 
annulments, relying on the Convention’s permissive language (award enforcement 
“may” be refused) as well as Article VII which in some circumstances permits national 
law to override more restrictive Convention terms. See Chromalloy Aeroservices v. 
Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D.D.C. 1996) (enforcing an award vacated in Egypt); 
Hilmarton v. OTV, Cour de cassation, June 10, 1997, 1997 REV. ARB. 376 (award 
vacated in Switzerland given effect in France). The emerging trend is toward the more 
sensible practice of granting comity to foreign annulment decisions. See Baker Marine 
Ltd. v. Chevron Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999). See generally Richard W. Hulbert, 
Further Observations on Chromalloy: A Contract Misconstrued, a Law Misapplied, and 
an Opportunity Foregone, 13 ICSID REV. 124, 144 (Spring 1998); Jan Paulsson, May or 
Must Under the New York Convention: An Exercise in Syntax and Linguistics, 14 ARB. 
INT’L 227, 229 (1998); William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International 
Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L LAW 805, 811 (1999). 
 148. For a suggestion that Article V be amended to reduce the effect of the 
arbitral situs, see Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Articles V 
and VII of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 37 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 43, 86 (2002) (proposing that annulment power be limited 
to “courts of the country whose law governs the arbitration”). While intriguing and 
creative, the proposal would likely be a trap for the unwary creating more problems 
than it would solve. When negotiating a contract, the parties rarely insert a reference 
to any legal system other than the law intended to govern the merits of the dispute. If 
there is any assumption about the lex arbitri it is that this will be the law of the place 
of proceedings. For example, if an American company contracted to do construction in 
China, the agreement might include reference to Chinese law by virtue of the place of 
performance. However, the parties would normally provide for arbitration in some 
neutral location such as London in order to reduce the prospect of intervention by 
courts of one party. To give annulment power to courts of the country of applicable law 
would exacerbate matters. In this connection, in one case a court in New York stayed 
an arbitration being conducted in New York until the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate was determined by courts in Venezuela, which had been designated as the 
 
judicial review for whatever grounds the legislators consider 
appropriate or for no grounds at all.149  
 Characterization of a transaction as international or domestic 
might be made according to two criteria: the nature of the 
transaction150 and the parties’ residences.151 For example, arbitration 
would be international if only one side to the dispute is resident in 
the United States.152 An alternative approach would characterize 
arbitration as international if the underlying controverted 
transaction implicates cross-border trade, finance, and investment.153  
 The most sensible approach would seem to be one based on 
residence. The special status of international arbitration justifies 
itself as a way to promote neutrality in dispute resolution among 
commercial actors from different countries. Difficult linguistic and 
procedural issues are more likely to arise when business managers 
from one nation must sue contracting parties abroad, not when they 
have litigation with compatriots concerning goods destined for export. 
                                                                                                                       
applicable law. See Pepsico v. Officina Central de Asesoria, 945 F. Supp. 69, 71-72 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) mot. denied, No. 97-7318 and No. 97-7386 (2d Cir. 1997).  
 149. By contrast, Article 9 of the European Arbitration Convention (European 
Convention on International Arbitration, art. 3, 484 U.N.T.S. 349 (1969)), which 
supplements the New York Convention among residents of member states, allows non-
recognition for award annulment only if the annulment was based on standards that 
track the first four defenses to foreign award enforcement. Accordingly, courts in 
Germany could refuse comity to a French annulment for violation of “international 
public policy,” not among the approved defenses. From a policy perspective, this 
approach is problematic in its indiscriminate mixing of both good and bad review 
standards. Arbitration would be impeded by some grounds for annulments that fall 
outside Convention-approved standards. For example, a requirement that all 
arbitrators must sign an award would give dissenters a tool to sabotage proceedings. 
However, other non-Convention grounds for review (such as monitoring arbitrator bias 
and error) might further legitimate interests of the parties and the regulating state. 
 150. N.C.P.C. art. 1492 (Fr.) defines arbitration as international if it “implicates 
international commerce.” See also FAA § 202 (excluding from the scope of the New 
York Convention agreements solely between U.S. citizens unless “the relationship 
involves property located abroad or envisages performance or enforcement abroad.” In 
Lander v. MMP, this provision was applied to bring within the Convention an 
arbitration in New York between two American corporations who had contracted to 
distribute shampoo products in Poland. Lander v. MMP, 107 F.3d 476, 477-78 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 151. See, e.g., LDIP art. 176, 192 (1989) (Switz.).  
 152. Corporate residence might be defined by reference to the place of 
incorporation and/or the principal place of business. FAA § 202 employs such a test, 
including as a U.S. citizen any corporation which is “incorporated or has its principal 
place of business in the United States.” Criteria for determining whether arbitrations 
are international are articulated in negative terms, to exclude from the scope of the 
New York Convention arbitration agreements “entirely between citizens of the United 
States” unless they relate to property, performance or enforcement abroad, or have 
some “other reasonable relation” with a foreign country.  
153. Section 1(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law adopts both tests, characterizing 
arbitration as international if the parties’ places of business are in different states, or if 
the transaction has a connection to a state other than the parties’ places of business. In 
addition, the Model Law allows parties to opt to treat their agreement as international.  
B. Secondary Matters 
 In addition to a more sensible framework for judicial review of 
arbitral awards, reform is warranted in several other areas that 
implicate international transactions: (i) arbitral jurisdiction, (ii) the 
role of state law, (iii) judicial deference to the parties’ choice of 
arbitral venue, and (iv) election to expand court scrutiny of awards. 
While of secondary importance compared with mandatory judicial 
review standards, reform in these areas would significantly improve 
the climate for international arbitration in the United States. 
1. Jurisdictional Determinations 
 Arbitration is a consensual process.154 Therefore allocating 
jurisdiction between courts and arbitrators remains a vexing problem 
with significant implications for arbitral autonomy, efficiency, and 
access to justice. The arbitral tribunal’s competence to determine its 
own power has been articulated in many countries under the 
variegated jurisdictional principle referred to as “compétence-
compétence.”155 The United States lags behind other nations in 
articulating how far arbitrators may rule on their authority, either as 
a preliminary matter (subject to subsequent court review) or in a 
more final and binding way. Confusion has been created by the 
“arbitrability dictum” in First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan,156 
suggesting that in some instances courts must defer to arbitrators’ 
decisions on their jurisdiction.  
 The problems of arbitral jurisdiction have been complicated by 
questions arising from the so-called “separability” doctrine (by which 
the validity of an arbitration clause is tested separately from the 
validity of the main contract)157 and the presumption in favor of 
arbitrability which has on occasion resulted in findings of implied 
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 154. A distinguished First Circuit judge has recently referred to the 
“abecedarian tenent” that a party cannot be forced to arbitrate if it has agreed to do so.  
Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (Selya, J.).  See also Steven Walt, 
Decision by Division: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial Arbitration, 51 
RUTGERS L. REV. 369, 370-73 (1999). 
 155. On the way notions of compétence-compétence vary from country to country, 
see William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan, 12 ARB. INT’L 
137, 149-51 (1996); William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of 
Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 140 (1997).  
 156. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). Also see 
cases summarized in PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 596-98 (1st Cir. 1996), 
describing the split in the circuits on whether time limits in arbitration rules constitute 
jurisdictional prerequisites to be determined by courts.  
 157. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-03 
(1967). For a recent decision on the costs and benefits of addressing jurisdiction as a 
preliminary issue (with a separate bifurcated decision on the merits) see Aoot Kalmneft 
v. Glencore Int’l AG, 2001 WL 82510627, July 2001, High Court of Justice (Q.B. 
2001), 1 LLOYD’S L. REP. 128 (2002); 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 577, reprinted in 16 INT’L ARB. 
REP. § A (Aug. 2001). 
 
(rather than actual) consent to the arbitration clause.158 Since no 
neutral courts of mandatory international jurisdiction exist to hear 
disputes if arbitrators misinterpret their powers,159 jurisdictional 
problems have a higher profile for cross-border transactions, making 
it critical for the FAA to provide explicit guidance on separability and 
compétence-compétence. 
 In the event of ambiguity in the contract, different presumptions 
would seem to be appropriate depending on whether the case is 
domestic or international. In a dispute between two residents of the 
United States, U.S. courts would normally be the default forum 
expected by the parties. By contrast, in an international transaction 
where the choice is not between courts in New York or New Jersey, 
but between ICC arbitration in Paris and courts in either Yemen or 
Boston, the parties might more logically be presumed to have favored 
the neutrality-enhancing choice of Paris arbitration. 
 Three cases, each decided by the U.S. Supreme Court during the 
past year, might serve as a springboard from which to examine how 
jurisdictional functions are allocated between courts and arbitrators. 
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds160 a broker-customer dispute 
arose from alleged misrepresentations about the quality of an 
investment. The Court gave the arbitrators a green light to determine 
whether their power to hear the case was affected by time limits 
contained in the arbitration rules. Pacificare Health Systems v. 
Book161 involved a controversy between doctors and managed-health-
care organizations. Here the Court essentially allowed the arbitrators 
themselves to determine whether they could grant treble damages in 
a RICO claim under an arbitration clause which explicitly denied 
them the power to award punitive damages.162 
 Finally, a plurality of the Court followed a similar line of 
reasoning in Green Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle,163 which involved 
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 158. See generally Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
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 159. Cf. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 17-25. 
 160. Howsam, 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 161. Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531, rev’g In re Humana 
Inc., Managed Care Litigation, 285 F. 3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 162. The physicians had filed claims under RICO (Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.  
 163. Green Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003). 
an attempt at class action arbitration of disputes arising from 
consumer loan agreements. Once again, the Supreme Court punted 
the question to the arbitrator himself. 
 In Howsam v. Dean Witter,164 the performance of an investment 
had proved unsatisfactory, causing the customer to bring an NASD 
arbitration claim against her broker. The brokerage firm filed suit in 
federal court requesting an injunction, on the ground that the original 
investment advice was more than six years old and thus ran afoul of 
the “eligibility rule” which requires any arbitration to be brought 
within 6 years of the relevant occurrence.165  
 Resolving a split among the circuits over who (judge or 
arbitrator) decides on “eligibility” requirements,166 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that jurisdiction was for the court. While paying lip 
service to the principle that judges would normally decide gateway 
jurisdictional matters unless the parties clearly provided otherwise, 
the Court engaged in the presumption that the parties intended for 
arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction with respect to NASD 
eligibility requirements. Rightly or wrongly, the Court interpreted 
the parties’ intent to include a bargain for the presumed expertise of 
the arbitrators in interpreting the NASD Rules.167  
 While the Court’s line of reasoning is plausible, the 
presumptions about the parties’ intent may be a bit far fetched. If 
they agreed that the case is ineligible for arbitration after six (6) 
years have elapsed, it is questionable whether one can speak of an 
“arbitrator” at all in the seventh year. Moreover, the decision is 
disturbing in its failure to distinguish between judicial intervention 
before and after the arbitration, which leaves the impression that 
arbitrators decide the jurisdictional question free from any 
subsequent court scrutiny. One cannot help but wonder whether 
arbitration is not serving as a rubbish bin for cases that would 
otherwise clog dockets. 
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to the statute of limitations. 
 166. See generally William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: 
Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133 (1997); 
reprinted [2000] ADR LAW J. 19 (Mar. 2000). 
 167. Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 593. The court also noted that § 10324 of the NASD 
Rules (formerly Rule 35) gave arbitrators power to “interpret and determine the 
applicability of all provisions under [the NASD] Code.” Id. 
 
 Pacificare Health Systems follows similar lines of reasoning. A 
group of doctors had filed a nationwide class action against several 
health maintenance organizations, alleging inter alia that the 
organizations had conspired to refuse proper reimbursement for 
services provided under the health plans to which the physicians had 
agreed. The legal basis for the doctors’ action included claims under 
RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 
allowing awards of treble damages. Unfortunately, however, the 
physicians had agreed to resolve disputes through arbitration, and 
some of the arbitration agreements were explicit in prohibiting 
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. 
 In a relatively brief opinion by Justice Scalia, a unanimous U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the health care organizations’ right to compel 
arbitration. The key to the Court’s reasoning is its assumption about 
the ambiguity of the term “punitive damages” and the nature of 
treble damages in the RICO statute. Since it would be “mere 
speculation” to presume that arbitrators might deny themselves the 
power to grant punitive damages, the court would not “take upon 
itself the authority to decide the antecedent question of how the 
ambiguity [concerning punitive damages] is to be resolved.”168 This 
approach invites further questions.  Can arbitrators effectively limit 
vindication of a public right by the way they interpret a contract? If 
so, where is the role for judicial review to insure that arbitration 
clauses do not work as a “prospective waiver” of statutory claims?169 
If not, then why let arbitrators address the question?  One thing is 
certain: the case will mean more work for lawyers and scholars. 
 A similar approach to arbitral jurisdiction was taken in a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle, 
concerning loans used to purchase mobile homes and finance 
residential improvements, with allegations that the lender violated 
South Carolina’s Consumer Protection Code by neglecting to give 
borrowers notice about the right to name their own lawyers and 
insurance agents. The interesting plurality decision split 4-1-3-1. 
Four Justices concluded that it was for the arbitrator to decide 
whether the contracts allowed class action arbitration. One concurred 
in the judgment although he would have preferred to affirm the 
South Carolina decision that ordered arbitration to proceed as a class 
action. Three Justices dissented on the basis that any imposition of 
class-wide arbitration contravened the parties’ contract, and one 
dissented on the ground that the FAA should not apply in state 
courts. 
 Where does all this leave us? The decisions in Howsam, 
Pacificare and Bazzle are plausible. However, the presumptions about 
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 168. Pacificare, 123 S. Ct. at 1535-36. 
 169. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 6145, 637 n.19 (1985). 
the parties’ intent may not be self-evident. The heart of the 
jurisdictional dilemma is that language, while often ambiguous, is not 
infinitely plastic. Some contract terms with a jurisdictional 
significance may well fall within the spectrum of matters the parties 
intended the arbitrator to interpret. Others, however, do not.  
 Much of the work in allocating tasks between courts and 
arbitrators will turn on characterization of the analytic task. One 
formulation might ask, “May persons who call themselves arbitrators 
determine their jurisdiction free from judicial review?” An affirmative 
answer would be conceptually problematic, implying that a piece of 
paper labeled “award” could be enforced without regard to the 
legitimate mission of the alleged arbitrator. An alternate phraseology 
could pose the jurisdictional question differently: “By agreeing to 
arbitrate, did the parties intend to waive their right to have courts 
determine a particular jurisdictional precondition to arbitration (such 
as time bars) or a particular substantive question (such as liability for 
costs of litigation begun in breach of the arbitration agreement)?” 
Answering the latter question would require a factual inquiry into 
the parties’ true intent.  
2. The Impact of State Law  
 The U.S. Supreme Court has not always explained the proper 
relationship of federal and state arbitration law.170 Several steps 
might improve things. First, courts should be directed to look 
exclusively to federal arbitration law in any transaction involving 
international commerce. Second, the FAA could provide a statutory 
definition of the grounds on which an arbitration clause might be 
found revocable or otherwise invalid.171 Third, appeal should be 
allowed when awards arguably falling under the New York 
Convention have been remanded to state courts.  
 A bit of background makes things more clear. The FAA is an 
anomaly. While the Act creates a body of federal law binding on 
states,172 its enforcement provisions speak only of federal district 
courts173 and create no general basis for federal court jurisdiction.174  
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 172. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (involving a 
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Muao v. Grosvenor Props., 99 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1092-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
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 173. Moreover, FAA enforcement provisions speak of federal district courts. To 
remedy this problem it has been suggested that 9 U.S.C. § 4 should provide for 
enforcement of arbitration agreements in “any” court (rather than the current 
reference to a U.S. district court) and should stipulate that proceedings under the FAA 
will be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States. See generally Joseph D. 
 
 The problem is remedied for international cases through a 
provision of the FAA that allows removal to federal court of actions 
relating to arbitrations covered by the New York Convention.175 
Difficulties arise when cases are sent back to state courts. Since 
remand orders are generally not subject to review, such situations 
inhibit the creation of a well developed body of federal law on 
Convention coverage.176  
 More generally, troubles derive from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ambivalence toward the role of state arbitration law. In Volt v. 
Stanford the Court held that an arbitration in California could be 
stayed under provisions of state law,177 reasoning that by the 
contractual choice-of-law clause the parties had incorporated 
California arbitration law into their agreement to arbitrate. However, 
six years later, the same Court in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton178 upheld an arbitral award for punitive damages, 
notwithstanding that the relevant choice-of-law clause called for 
application of New York law, which prohibits arbitrators from 
awarding punitive damages.  
 Squaring these two decisions is not easy.179 While states cannot 
make implementation of arbitration agreements more difficult than 
other contractual commitments,180 state law generally governs the 
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See also Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1119-21 (1st Cir. 1989); Allied-
matter of whether and what two contracting parties agreed to 
arbitrate.181 The power of states to affect the validity of arbitration 
clauses derives from FAA Section 2, which provides that an 
arbitration agreement is valid “save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”182 While the text 
itself does not specify whether “at law or in equity” refers to state or 
federal law, the absence of any federal common law of contracts has 
generally led courts to look to state law to determine grounds for 
revocation.183 
 Consequently, state arbitration statues now come into play when 
their provisions are perceived to be in harmony with the policies 
underlying federal law,184 particularly on ancillary matters such as 
authority to administer oaths.185 However, ascertaining the existence 
of harmony or conflict between federal and state norms is not always 
an easy task. For example, in the United States, no firm consensus 
exists on whether the FAA is consistent with state measures that 
authorize interim relief in arbitration186 and consolidation of 
different proceedings that present similar questions of law and 
fact.187 
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 Federal preemption complicates matters for consumers in 
particular. The U.S. Supreme Court has struck down on federalism 
grounds several state initiatives to protect weaker parties against ill-
advised agreements to arbitrate.188 State law would normally govern 
the formation and scope of an arbitration agreement as it determines 
the validity of most contracts in the absence of a federal common 
law.189 However, the so-called “pro-arbitration” policy of the FAA190 
(better conceived as a pro-contract policy) has been interpreted to 
preempt states from singling out arbitration clauses for threshold 
validity limitations more onerous than those imposed on other 
contracts. Thus, state arbitration statutes fill gaps in federal law only 
if consistent with the latter’s general purposes.191  
 One potential avenue of escape for states skeptical of arbitration 
has recently been suggested by the Supreme Court of Montana. In 
refusing to enforce an arbitration clause against a nonagenarian 
widow allegedly defrauded by her investment adviser,192 the court 
focused on the waiver of rights guaranteed by the Montana 
Constitution (access to courts and trial by jury) implicit in 
arbitration. Such waiver was held to have been outside the customer’s 
“reasonable expectation” and thus invalid against the weaker party in 
an adhesion contract.193 Thus, the Montana court struck down the 
agreement not by singling out arbitration, but by upholding access to 
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constitutional rights generally, under principles of law applicable to 
all contracts.194 
 One might fear that a pro-arbitration policy will result in overly 
broad findings of implied consent in consumer cases. Cases taking 
such an approach would misconstrue the FAA’s pro-arbitration 
policy.195 At most what can be said is that ambiguous contract 
language should be presumed to permit arbitration, as was done in 
Mastrobuono,196 which is quite different from implying an agreement 
to arbitrate based only on a form which in the fine print recites a duty 
to arbitrate.197  
 Preemption has been intertwined with questions of party intent 
in the context of choice-of-law clauses. The question has often been 
whether contractual selection of state law was intended to encompass 
arbitration procedures as well as substantive law.198 Similar 
questions arise when the contract choice-of-law clauses stipulate the 
law of a non-U.S. jurisdiction.199 
3. Arbitral Venue 
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 In international arbitration, the traditional assumption has been 
that judges will hold the parties to their agreement on arbitral situs, 
both as the place for the proceedings and the forum for any 
annulment action. A recent line of cases, however, has called this 
principle into question. First, U.S. courts have compelled arbitration 
outside the contractually-selected venue.200 Second, courts have 
suggested that awards may be vacated other than where made,201 
encouraging a race to the courthouse to gain precedence with a “first-
filed” motion.202  
 Both lines of cases rest on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court 
allowing an award to be set aside at a place other than the arbitral 
situs. In Cortez Byrd Chips Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction 
Company203 the Court held that an award rendered in Alabama could 
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(Souter, J.) (unanimous). The Contractor moved to confirm an award in Alabama, after 
the project owner a few days earlier had filed a motion to vacate in Mississippi. 
Reversing a decision in the Northern District of Alabama upheld by the Eleventh 
Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court gave priority to the first filed motion in Mississippi. 
Ironically, the Supreme Court supported its holding in part by stating that a restrictive 
reading (limiting vacatur to the award situs) would “preclude any action [in courts of 
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be vacated in Mississippi. The FAA venue provisions (making vacatur 
available “in and for the district wherein the award was made”204) 
were held to be permissive, thus allowing a motion to vacate in any 
district proper under the general venue statute, including the place of 
defendant’s residence.205 
 Whatever value such a rule might have in domestic arbitration, 
it will produce dramatically disagreeable results in an international 
context. While such a free-for-all might not much matter when 
competing motions are brought in Alabama and Mississippi, allowing 
the losing party to seek annulment in its own home court would be 
extremely disruptive for international arbitration. If a Massachusetts 
seller and a German buyer agree to arbitrate in London, they expect 
proceedings in England subject to judicial review by English courts. 
Had they wanted arbitration and court proceedings in Berlin or 
Boston they could have bargained for just that.206 Such cross-border 
meddling will inevitably invite reactions that jeopardize the stability 
of cross-border arbitration, one of the great achievements of 
international business law during the nearly half century since 
adoption of the New York Convention. 
4. Modification of Court Scrutiny 
 The absence of appeal on the merits of an award can be both an 
advantage (no judicial second-guessing the parties’ chosen decision-
maker) and a drawback (frustrating litigants when the arbitrator 
gets things wrong, thus reducing arbitration’s attractiveness in the 
eyes of some business managers). In the United States, a patchwork 
of uncertain case law governs the parties’ ability to engage in any 
custom tailoring of their own judicial review standards. Courts have 
generally interpreted the FAA to deny parties an opportunity to 
reduce by contract the level of court scrutiny,207 and attempts to 
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giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of 
the action is situated.’” Cortez, 529 U.S. at 198. 
 206. Vacatur of foreign awards would also be contrary to sound prior case law. 
See Int’l Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y 
Commercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the FAA did not allow 
vacatur of a Mexican award notwithstanding that the merits of the dispute were to be 
decided under New York law).  See also Four Searsons Hotels and Resorts B.V. v. 
Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Industral Risk Insurers v. 
MAN Guttenhoffnungschutta, 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 207. See, e.g., Hoeft v. MVL Group Inc., 343 F.3d 57 (2003); M & C Corp. v. 
Erwin Behr GmbH, 87 F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996); supra note 143 and accompanying 
text.  
 
enlarge the scope of review for error of law and fact have been met 
with mixed reception.208  
 As to expansion of judicial review, the better approach might be 
to provide by statute that courts shall respect the litigants’ clear 
agreement for judicial review on legal and factual merits. Otherwise, 
some parties might shy away from arbitration out of fear that 
potential arbitrator error presents too great a risk.209 The default 
regime would remain one that provides only for review related to 
procedural fairness.210 
 Concerning the parties’ right to lower the standards by excluding 
all judicial review at the situs, the right rule is less certain. At least 
when no party to the arbitration is from the United States (thus 
reducing the chances that U.S. interests will be affected by the 
dispute), one can see the merit in allowing the parties complete 
freedom to eliminate court intervention at the arbitral seat. On 
reflection, however, the wiser path might be to permit courts to 
provide minimum policing of all arbitration in the United States to 
ensure basic procedural integrity and compliance with international 
public policy norms.  
C. Consumer and Employment Contracts Revisited 
1. The Current Scope of the FAA 
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 208. See, e.g., Koycera Corp. v. Prudential Bache Trade Serv., 391 F3d 987 (9th 
Cir. 2003), vacating en banc Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 
(1997); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 262 (4th Cir. 1997); Gateway 
Techs. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995); New England 
Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 62-64 (D. Mass. 1998); supra notes 105, 147 
and accompanying text. 
 209. See, e.g., William H. Knull, II & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on 
International Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
531, 533 (2000) (stating that possible consumers will choose not to arbitrate because 
their transactions are too large to bear the risk); Peter B. Rutledge, On the Importance 
of Institutions: Review of Arbitral Awards for Legal Errors, 19 J. INT’L ARB.(2) 81 
(2002); Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
225 (1997). At least one state (New Jersey) has such a regime for its “Alternative 
Procedure for Dispute Resolution Contract Actions.” See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23A-13 
(2000) (permitting vacatur because the arbitrator “committed prejudicial error by 
erroneously applying the law to the issues and facts”); see also Michael Scodro, 
Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 
1946 (1996) (practitioners have recommended against bringing novel legal claims 
before arbitrators). 
 210. In a sense, expansion of judicial review can be seen as a restriction on 
arbitral jurisdiction, with the parties giving the arbitrators power only to render only 
advisory opinions. See generally Alan Scott Rau, “Arbitrability” and Judicial Review: A 
Rejoinder, 1 J. AM. ARB. 159 (2002). Professor Rau uses the multipurpose term 
“arbitrability” not in reference to topics that may be submitted to arbitration (in the 
context of sensitive policies related to subjects such as competition and securities law), 
but rather as a synonym for the contractual contours of the arbitral mission. See id. 
 A separate statute for international business arbitration would 
be less urgent if American arbitration law contained protective 
provisions for consumer and employment contracts. Recently, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded rather than reduced 
the scope of the FAA with respect to such transactions.211  
 Particularly instructive is the decision in Circuit City v. 
Adams,212 holding that the FAA covers all employment contracts 
except those related to “transportation workers” (such as seamen and 
railroad employees) engaged in interstate commerce. Hailed as a 
victory for arbitration, Circuit City may end up doing more harm than 
good to business arbitration. On remand the Ninth Circuit applied 
the FAA, but held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable due 
in part to the fact that it was linked to a limitation on damages.213 
When one legal framework covers all arbitration, such precedents 
risk being trotted out in international contexts. Regardless of the 
correct rule for employment contracts, the right to contract for 
damage caps is clearly desirable in international commerce, where 
such caps facilitate cross-border transactions by permitting 
corporations to manage global risks more effectively.  
2. Making Distinctions 
 Recognizing that values which commend arbitration in one 
context make it questionable in another, Congress could enact 
statutory safeguards to reduce the prospect that arbitration clauses 
in standard form agreements maneuver ill-informed individuals 
before biased arbitrators far from home.214 Arbitration clauses are 
different from other contracts in that they affect not only substantive 
rights but also the procedure by which the rights are vindicated. 
Agreements to waive access to otherwise competent courts are 
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 211. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 116-21 (2001) (permitting 
arbitration of an employment discrimination claim against an electronics retailer that 
had been originally filed in California state court); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 
531 U.S. 79, 82-83, 92 (2000) (allowing arbitration of a claim under the Truth in 
Lending Act related to sale of a mobile home in Alabama). Although the arbitration 
clause will bind the employee, it will not normally prevent action by government 
agencies that are non-parties to the clause. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 
279, 296-98 (2002) (holding that E.E.O.C. may obtain victim-specific remedies in court 
in an enforcement action against a former employer who had agreed to arbitrate 
discrimination claims). 
 212. Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 213. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2002). In 
addition, the Court found unconscionable the unilateral nature of the clause, which 
bound only the employee. Id. at 892. For another recent case finding an arbitration 
clause unconscionable, see Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 927-36 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 214. For articles exploring the role of consent in securities arbitration, see 
generally Richard Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration, Wither 
Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1329 (1996), Bruce Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The 
Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 433 (1996), and Jeffrey Stempel, Bootstrapping 
and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 
BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996). 
 
qualitatively different from contract terms such as price or interest 
rate.215 Therefore, criteria for enforcing agreements to arbitrate 
might reasonably require evidence of actual informed consent, 
perhaps in the form of an agreement made after the dispute arises.216  
 While no reliable studies exist of arbitration’s fairness and 
efficiency, a growing body of anecdotal evidence suggests that certain 
industry-specific arbitral institutions operate as assembly lines to 
turn claims into awards, with inadequate notice and little due 
process. Without endorsing some of the more inflammatory rhetoric of 
consumer advocates and plaintiffs’ lawyers,217 one can still appreciate 
how arbitration can become an instrument of injustice when an 
arbitral institution dominated by a single industry nominates 
arbitrators whose reappointment (thus compensation) indirectly 
depends on the satisfaction given to the industry.218  
 Many scholars justify these clauses as ways to promote efficiency 
and lower the price of goods and services.219 In some cases this may 
be correct, as when excessive liability inhibits productive activity.220 
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 215. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 
SUP. CT. REV. 331, 335 (1996) (stating that adhesion contracts lack the characteristics 
traditionally providing the moral justification for enforcing the promises they contain). 
 216. Other alternatives to promote informed consent (such as a separate 
document) would likely be less effective, since the dominant party could in effect 
require signature of the arbitration clause as a pre-condition to the main contract. 
Some commentators might go even further and argue that as a matter of public policy 
the right of consumers to seek redress of grievances in court should not be subject to 
waiver at all. The emotional force of this argument varies according to the arbitration 
paradigm one has in mind, whether “efficient dispute resolution” or “something 
companies do to deny customers their day in court.” 
 217. One commentator reportedly went so far as to suggest that “arbitrators are 
not required to follow the law.” See interview with Cliff Palefsky, reported in Analysis 
& Perspective, 70 U.S.L.W. 2755, 2756 (2002). The assertion that arbitrators are 
allowed to be lawless is at odds with the existence of “manifest disregard of the law” as 
a standard for judicial review, and inconsistent with the provisions of many arbitration 
rules. For example, Article 17(3) of the ICC Arbitration rules requires application of 
law unless the parties have expressly authorized arbitrators to act as amiables 
compositeurs, a shorthand term for decisions based on the arbitrator’s sense of fairness, 
free of legal constraints.  
 218. If the loser in such a system is a large corporation with access to counsel, 
an award based on an unjust process would normally result in a motion for vacatur, as 
well as damage to the reputation of the arbitrator and the supervisory institution. The 
prospect of such checks and balances seems less likely if the loser is a low-paid 
employee who finds it difficult to muster resources for a challenge or a publicity 
campaign. 
 219. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal 
Claims: A Legal Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 223-24 (2000) (explaining that 
the alternate savings enhances wealth if litigation costs exceed the increased the 
increased deterrence benefits). 
 220. The effect of jury verdicts on medical practice constitutes one example of 
the potentially pernicious effect of undue liability. See, e.g., Nevada May Limit Jury 
Awards to Stem Exodus of Doctors, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 2002, A-2, cols. 4-5, 
reporting on orthopedists who shut down practices because of high insurance 
premiums, causing closure of the trauma unit at the Nevada University Medical 
It is uncertain whether merchants who escape liability in connection 
with their services and merchandise will pass the savings on to the 
consumer, rather than put them into management bonuses and 
shareholder dividends. Other responses to the problem of too much 
liability might include systematic law reform or judicial acceptance of 
limitations of liability clauses,221 rather than schemes to escape the 
legal system altogether.222  
 The point here is not to argue that pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses are always unsuited to consumer and employment disputes. 
This debate is best left to those with greater understanding of 
economics and or social justice. Rather, my goal is simply to 
emphasize that without limits on spillover from domestic to 
international arbitration, the latter may not reach its full potential 
due to uncertainty about the level of freedom from judicial 
intervention. A separate statute would help to insulate arbitration 
from the undue judicial intervention that is inevitable in consumer 
and employment cases. 
3. Importing the European Experience  
 Europeans take for granted that consumer transactions should 
be subject to a separate legal framework.223 The European Union has 
adopted forceful limitations on the validity of consumer arbitration 
clauses224 and other “unfair” contract terms.225  
                                                                                                                       
Center. Initiatives to cap malpractice awards were spurred by the discontinuance of 
coverage by a group that had insured most of the state’s physicians. Id. 
 221. On the “economic loss rule” in limitation of liability, see Eastern River 
Steamship v. Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 868-71 (1986), expressing a need to keep products 
liability and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on 
damages. 
 222. Admittedly there is no need for legal decisions to be the preferred form of 
dispute resolution. Family, school and church controversies, for example, would seem 
better resolved outside the courts. However, once the controversy implicates either 
public concerns or property within the jurisdiction of some government, recourse to 
state courts and legal principles becomes hard to avoid. A telling illustration can be 
found in the complex criteria for judicial intervention in intra-church property disputes 
in the United States, which almost from its beginnings as a federal system has aimed 
to avoid the entanglement of church and state. See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (First Amendment prohibits inquiry into church 
procedures); Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488, 520 (1820) (declining to allow church 
practices to be set as law).  
 223. See generally Jean Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the 
U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest 
of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002). For a thoughtful paper on alternative 
forms of consumer protection in arbitration, see David Butler, Consumer Arbitrations: 
A South African and International Perspective (presented to the Southern African 
Association of Arbitrators in Sandton, South Africa, Sept. 15, 2000) (copy on file with 
author).  
 224. Council Directive 93/13/EEC (Apr. 5, 1993), 1993 (L 95) 29; see also Council 
Directive 98/27/EC, 1998 (L 166) 51 (relative to injunctions for the protection of 
consumers’ interests). Consumer contracts include agreements related to property, 
services or credit with any natural person acting for purposes outside his trade, 
 
 European member states have implemented this Directive in 
various ways. For example, in England general consumer protection 
regulations have been expressly made applicable to arbitration 
agreements.226 The 1996 Arbitration Act extends the consumer 
protection scheme to arbitration agreements regardless of whether 
they cover present or future disputes and regardless of what law is 
applicable to the arbitration agreement.227 Moreover, arbitration 
agreements will be considered unfair (thus presumptively invalid) if 
they relate to claims below an administratively fixed amount.228  
 Independent of the European Union Directive, many European 
countries have their own traditions of protecting consumers and less 
sophisticated parties. France has long made a distinction between the 
pre-dispute clause compromissoire and the post-dispute compromis, 
the former being valid only in contracts between merchants 
                                                                                                                       
business or profession. Like any definition, this one may have unintended effects when 
a consumer is the party with the economic power and sophistication. If an impecunious 
carpenter builds a house for a prosperous captain of industry, the latter (entering into 
an agreement outside the scope of his or her profession) would technically be the 
protected consumer. Cf. LDIP art. 120 (1989) (Switz.) (governing choice of law) 
(referring to contracts “for current personal or family consumption” which are “not 
connected with the [consumer’s] professional or business activity”). 
 225. Article 6 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC provides that such “unfair” terms 
“shall not be binding.” 1993 (L 95) 31. Article 3(3) refers to an Annex of unfair terms, 
which gives examples of unfairness, one of which (in § 1(q)) includes terms that hinder 
consumers’ rights “to take legal action” or] “to take disputes exclusively to arbitration 
not covered by legal provisions.” Id. The meaning of this curious phraseology is not 
immediately clear, at least to the author. Most arbitration would seem to be “covered 
by legal provisions” in the sense of being subject to the relevant national arbitration 
statute. Several constructions of these words (none entirely satisfactory) could be 
suggested: (1) arbitration agreements are per se invalid in all consumer transactions; 
(2) consumer contracts may not contain “equity clauses” which permit arbitrators to 
decide without reference to a fixed legal system; (3) consumers may not waive appeal 
on questions of law, presuming such right exists under the relevant legislation. 
 226. Arbitration Act §§ 89-91 extends application of the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1994, which implement European Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC. Arbitration Act, 1996, §§ 89-91 (Eng.). These sections cover 
Scotland, while the rest of the Act applies only in England and Wales. Id. 
 227. These regulations invalidate “unfair” contract terms causing “significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations” to the consumer’s detriment. See 
Consumer Contract Regulations §§ 3, 4. Consumers include individuals acting for 
purposes outside their business. Id. § 2. One schedule to the accompanying Consumer 
Contract Regulations contains an illustrative list of terms that may be regarded as 
unfair, and therefore non-binding. These examples of unfairness include terms that 
require consumers to “take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal 
provisions.” Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1994, schedule 3, § 1(q) 
(Eng.). 
 228. The current floor on presumptive unfair claims is £5000, fixed for England, 
Wales and Scotland by the Secretary of State, and for Northern Ireland by the 
Department of Economic Development. Arbitration Act § 91 and Unfair Arbitration 
Agreements (Specified Amount) Order 1999, 1999 No. 2167, brought into force on 
January 1, 2000. On consumer arbitration in Britain, see M. J. CHAPMAN, COMMERCIAL 
& CONSUMER ARBITRATION (1997). 
(commerçants) or persons contracting with respect to a professional 
activity.229 In Germany, both parties must sign consumer arbitration 
agreements, which must either be contained in a separate document 
or have notarial certification.230 Sweden prohibits enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses with respect to goods and services 
supplied for private use.231 
 American legislation to protect consumers and employees could 
take the European model as its starting point. A suitable ceiling 
should be imposed on the legislation’s scope, however, carving out 
from the protective framework any compensation or transactions for 
goods and services above a fixed sum. There would seem to be little 
need to protect the CEO of a major corporation seeking to escape 
arbitration commitments with respect to the purchase of a Rolls 
Royce or enforcement of a multi-million dollar golden parachute.232 
D. A Smörgåsbord Approach 
 Outside the United States there has been widespread recognition 
of the need for varying levels of judicial intervention in different types 
of arbitration. As mentioned earlier, minimal review standards meet 
the need for a more level playing field in cross-border arbitration. 
Such a “less-is-more” approach has been adopted in many countries, 
including Belgium, France and Switzerland, as well as places that 
have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law such as Hong 
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 229. See C. CIV. art. 2061 (Fr.) (recently liberalized by Law No. 2001-420 of May 
15, 2001, art. 126, J.O., May 16, 2001, at 7776 (Loi sur les nouvelles relations 
économiques, art. 126), to provide that “. . . a pre-dispute arbitration clause is valid in 
contracts concluded with respect to professional activity . . . la clause compromissoire 
est valable dans les contrats conclus à raison d’une activité professionnelle”). Pre-
dispute clauses are now allowed among members of the so-called liberal professions 
(such as lawyers, doctors and architects), tradesmen (artisans) and farmers 
(agriculteurs), as well as in professional partnerships agreements. See generally 
Philippe Fouchard, La Laborieuse réforme de la clause compromissoire par la loi du 15 
mai 2001, 2001 REV. ARB. 397 (2001); C. COM. art. 631 (Fr.) (covering merchants). 
 230. See ZPO art. 1031(5) (F.R.G.). In Germany, the Notar (the notaire in 
France, Switzerland, Belgium and analogous offices in other European countries) is a 
legal professional, with little resemblance to the notary known in the United States.  
 231. Lag om Skiljeförfarande, 1999, § 6, reprinted in 1999 STOCKHOLM 
ARBITRATION REPORT 111 (vol. 1, 1999) (covering disputes between businesses and 
consumers concerning goods and services “principally for private use” (huvudsakligen 
enskilt bruk)). 
 232. For a recent case in which a discharged company president was found to 
have waived his right to challenge a AAA award, see Brook v. Peak International Ltd. 
294 F. 3d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 2002). On arbitration of upper level employees, see Stuart 
J. Schwab & Randall Thomas, What Do CEO’s Bargain For?: An Empirical Study of 
Key Legal Components of CEO Contracts (forthcoming 2003-04), finding that a third of 
CEO contracts (180 of the 548 surveyed) include arbitration clauses, and expressing 
doubt that these clauses were the result of coercion by employers. See also Edward 
Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Classes in High Stakes Employment 
Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 110-19 (2002) (exploring dispute 
resolution clauses with the highly skilled employee).  
 
Kong and Scotland.233 The aim is to reduce the barriers to cross-
border economic cooperation created by fear of foreign fora, which can 
inhibit productive risk-taking in overseas markets.  
 In many jurisdictions the type of judicial review will depend 
principally on the parties’ election. England and New Zealand permit 
litigants to opt into or opt out of appeal on the substantive merits of 
the case.234 Switzerland, Belgium, and at least one Canadian 
province allow (under certain circumstances) exclusion of all judicial 
review at the arbitral situs.235  
 Two of these regimes merit special attention. French arbitration 
law has long recognized the distinction between domestic and 
international arbitration,236 codified in decrees promulgated more 
than twenty years ago.237 Striking a balance between the goals of 
arbitral autonomy and judicial scrutiny of an arbitration’s basic 
procedural integrity, French arbitration law allows courts to set aside 
international awards rendered in France only on statutorily-limited 
grounds which are separate from those applicable in domestic 
cases.238  
 Switzerland goes further, and offers a choice among three 
options for international arbitration.239 As a default rule, the Swiss 
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 233. See CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1676-1723 (Belg.) (explaining the arbitration 
review standards); Arbitration Ordinance, Ch. 341 (Hong Kong). 
 234. See Arbitration Act, 1996, c.23, § 69 (Eng.) (providing for appeal on 
questions of English law unless “otherwise agreed” by the parties). The 1996 New 
Zealand Arbitration Act has a similar aim with a somewhat more complex structure. 
Section 6 of the Act says that Schedule 2 (containing provisions not applicable to all 
arbitration) applies to domestic arbitration if there has been no agreement otherwise 
(i.e., opt out) and to international arbitration only if the parties so agree (i.e., opt in). 
For example, Clause 5 of Schedule 2 allows appeal on point of law with leave of court. 
Section 11 of the Act permits enforcement of an arbitration clause against a consumer 
only if in a separate agreement the consumer certifies that he or she agrees to the 
arbitration. See generally David A.R. Williams, The New Zealand Experience with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, 7 LCIA NEWS 4 (August 2002).  
 235. See LDIP art. 192 (1989) (Switz.); CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1717(4) (Belg.). 
Through case law Ontario, Canada, seems to have arrived at somewhat the same 
result. See generally Noble China, Inc. v. Lei, 42 O.R.3d 69 (1998). 
 236. See generally MATTHIEU DE BOISSESON, DROIT FRANÇAIS DE L’ARBITRAGE 
INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL (1990); PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & 
BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, TRAITE DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1996). 
 237. See N.C.P.C. art. 1442-1491 (Fr.) (enacted in 1980 for domestic arbitration); 
N.C.P.C. art. 1492-1507 (Fr.) (enacted in 1981 for international arbitration). 
 238. Annulment criteria for international awards set forth in Article 1502 
permit vacatur if (i) the arbitrator decided without an arbitration agreement, (ii) the 
arbitral tribunal was irregularly composed, (iii) the arbitral tribunal violated its 
mission, (iv) due process (literally “the principle of adversarial process”) was not 
respected or (v) award recognition would be contrary to international public policy. 
N.C.P.C. art. 1502 (Fr.). 
 239. See LDIP art. 176-195 (1989) (Switz.). See generally P. LALIVE ET AL., LE 
DROIT DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE (1989). The scope of the 
LDIP is defined by a residence-oriented test, which applies the statute to an arbitration 
if at least one party is foreign, in the sense of being neither domiciled nor habitually 
federal statute provides five bases for challenge of awards related to 
procedural fairness and public policy.240 Parties may opt for more 
expansive scrutiny under cantonal standards241 that include vacatur 
for “arbitrariness” under the Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat.242 
By explicit agreement, review of awards may be excluded entirely243 
if no party is resident in Switzerland.244 
VI. FEAR OF REFORM OVERDOSE 
A. A Pandora’s Box of Special Interests 
 Opponents of arbitration reform in the United States sometimes 
express fear that Congress will not know where to stop in cleaning up 
the FAA.245 The legislative process will open a Pandora’s box of 
special interest groups wishing to tinker unduly with the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements. As one colleague remarked, “You don’t 
want to see how laws or sausages are made.”  
 In particular, there is concern that an alliance of consumer 
advocates and the so-called “plaintiff’s bar” (trial lawyers who bring 
tort actions) will work to reduce the enforceability of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses, which have been portrayed as a way to deny 
fundamental rights and promote damage awards less generous 
(others would say more reasonable) than those granted by civil 
juries.246  
 Apprehension of reform is puzzling on several levels. Initially, 
one might ask why special interests should not get involved if change 
is needed. Why should the law allow a bank to force a single mother 
from Boston to arbitrate her credit card debt in Alaska under rules 
                                                                                                                       
resident in Switzerland at the moment the arbitration clause is signed. See Kolbrunner 
v. Federici, D.T.F. (October 27, 1995). 
 240. Grounds for challenge include (i) irregular composition of the arbitral 
tribunal; (ii) an erroneous jurisdictional decision; (iii) a decision beyond the matters 
submitted to the arbitrators, or failure to decide a matter within the request for 
arbitration; (iv) failure to respect the “equality of the parties” or the adversarial 
process; (v) incompatibility of the award with public policy (ordre public). See generally 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Articles 190 et 191 LDIP: Les Recours Contre les Sentences 
Arbitrales, 10 ASA BULL. 64 (1992). 
 241. At the present, reforms are underway to “federalize” Swiss procedural law 
in a way that may ultimately reorganize provisions of the Intercantonal Arbitration 
Concordat to put them on a federal level. 
 242. “Arbitrariness” is defined to include “evident violations of law or equity.” 
CONCORDAT INTERCANTONAL SUR L’ARBITRAGE art. 36(f) (Switz.).  
 243. The statute speaks of a déclaration expresse / ausdrückliche Erklärung. 
 244. LDIP art. 192 (1989) (Switz.) provides, “If neither of the parties has its 
domicile, its habitual residence or a business establishment in Switzerland, they may 
by express declaration in the arbitration agreement or in a subsequent written 
agreement waive all judicial recourse against the arbitral award. . . .” 
 245. See generally Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 157 (2002). 
 246. Tort claims often find their way into arbitration through broad clauses 
covering “questions related to or arising in connection with” the contract. 
 
giving her little hope of presenting her case? Moreover, during the 
past three decades the United States has seen several instances of 
rational arbitration reform that did not occasion catastrophe.247 If the 
past is any guide to the future, Congress should be able to replicate 
the common sense shown in earlier arbitration legislation.248 
 Attacks on abusive employment and consumer arbitration have 
already begun, both in the form of judicial actions249 and 
legislation.250 In light of these understandable initiatives (some of 
which actually aim at the right target), the question now may not be 
whether special interest groups will get involved but whether their 
influence can be channeled in a way that does not interfere with 
legitimate international interests.  
B. Random Change or Reasoned Reform? 
 The inevitability of reform makes it all the more vital to consider 
a separate statute for cross-border arbitration.251 Problematic forces 
for change are operating in the backlash against arbitration of 
consumer, employment, and small business disputes,252 building on 
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 247. In 1970, Chapter II of the FAA adopted the New York Convention, and in 
1990, Chapter III implemented the Panama (Inter-American) Arbitration Convention. 
In 1988, Congress eliminated the Act of State doctrine in enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and awards, clarified the effect of sovereign immunity in international 
arbitration, and refined the right of interlocutory appeal from arbitration-related court 
orders. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 15-16 (2002) (explaining what an appeal may be taken from). 
Moreover, in May, 2002, the so-called “Comma Act” made certain technical changes to § 
10 of the FAA (providing for award vacatur). See Comma Act, Pub. L. No. 107-69, 116 
Stat. 1758 (indenting, changing words, and redesignating subsections). 
 248. The fear that participatory democracy cannot produce a reasonable 
arbitration statute notwithstanding sensible legislation on prior occasions brings to 
mind the academic gibe, “You may be right in practice, but can your idea work in 
theory?” 
 249. See, e.g., Kloss v. Jones, 310 Mont. 123, 146-47 (2002) (refusing to compel 
arbitration against a financial adviser accused of negligence and breach of fiduciary 
duty, finding the arbitration clause to be an impermissible attempt to waive access to 
courts and trial by jury, which were considered basic rights guaranteed by the 
Montana Constitution. For a survey of critiques against employment arbitration, see 
Steven Greenhouse, Case Challenges Employees’ Waiving Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 5, 2003, at A21.  
 250. The American Arbitration Association lst year compiled a list of more than 
fifty federal legislative proposals that either limit or expand ADR.  See Report from 
Washington—ADR Legislation of the 107th Congress, DISPUTE RESOLUTION TIMES 4 
(Oct.-Dec. 2002).  
 251. The inexorable nature of reform brings to mind the words carved over the 
door to the house of the eminent Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, “Vocatus atque non 
vocatus Deus aderit” (Whether summoned or not, God will be present). The words were 
also carved on Jung’s tombstone in the Protestant cemetery in Kusnacht, outside of 
Zürich. 
 252. In addition to initiatives for consumer and employment contracts, changes 
related to shipping arbitration are also under consideration. The Committee on 
Maritime Arbitration of the Maritime Law Association has drafted amendments that 
legitimate concerns addressed several years ago by the American 
Arbitration Association.253  
 Legislative initiatives include the Predatory Lending Consumer 
Protection Act, which would prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses 
in certain mortgages,254 and the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract 
Act, which makes pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable in 
automobile franchises.255 Amendments to the FAA have been 
proposed which make employment arbitration agreements 
unenforceable unless concluded after the dispute arises.256 At the 
state level, anti-arbitration measures have been tailored to pass 
muster on federalism concerns,257 including a series of statutes 
                                                                                                                       
would cover only maritime arbitration. These proposals would permit consolidation of 
separate proceedings, 9 U.S.C. § 4(b), appointment of a second arbitrator by the 
claimant if the respondent fails to appoint its arbitrator promptly, subpoenas and court 
assistance to preserve testimony, and arbitrator modification of awards for clerical 
errors. 9 U.S.C. §§ 4(b)-(c), 7(b)-(c), 11(d) (West 2003). 
 253. See American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol (May 
1998) (implementing special measures related to matters such as consumer access to 
information, convenient location, moderate cost and speed). 
 254. S. 2438, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by Senator Paul Sarbanes, Chair of 
the Senate Banking Committee). The bill would apply to any mortgage with an APR 
that exceeds by six per cent (for first mortgages) or eight per cent (for second 
mortgages) the rate for U.S. Treasury securities. Id. 
 255. Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Act, § 11028, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 
Stat. 1758 (enacted as 15 U.S.C. § 1226), which became law in November 2002. The 
statute is sometimes known as the Bono Bill in recognition of its original sponsor the 
late Sonny Bono. The statute provides that “arbitration may be used to settle such 
controversy [arising out of a motor vehicle franchise contract] only if after such 
controversy arises all parties to such controversy consent in writing to use arbitration 
to settle such controversy.” An earlier version of this law, introduced by Senators 
Grassley and Feingold, would have added a Section 17 at the end of Chapter 1 of the 
FAA. S. 1020, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). The fact that the provision was kept out of the 
FAA itself has provided some comfort to forces skeptical of reform. For a description of 
the legislative process from the perspective of the National Automobile Dealers 
Association, see Harry Stoffer, A Lesson in Sausage Making: Or How NADA Got 
Congress to Ban Mandatory Binding Arbitration, 77 AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (No. 6022), 
Jan. 27, 2003. 
 256. S. 2435, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002) (introduced by Senators Kennedy and 
Feingold). This would effectively overrule the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (discussed supra notes 211-13 and 
accompanying text). 
 257. The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), however, seems to be 
relatively free from the anti-arbitration backlash, leaving the issue of unconscionable 
arbitration clauses to general state contract law. See Uniform Arbitration Act § 12 
(amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2002); Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, 
Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 
226 (2002); Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, 
Revising, and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 7 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 15 (2001) (stating that 
the doctrine requires enforceability of arbitration agreements under state law 
determined by the same standards applied to other contracts); Richard E. Speidel, 
ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, and 
the Limitations of Modern Arbitration Law, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 167, 179 
(2002); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: Future Lies Down a Number of Divergent 
Paths, 6 J. DISP. RESOL. 16, 16-20 (2000); Stephen J. Ware, “Opt-In” for Judicial 
Review of Errors of Law Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 263, 263 (1999); see also ABA Section of Litigation, Arbitration—Fixing What’s 
 
enacted in California.258  
 Consumer advocacy groups have recently questioned arbitration 
in a report published by Ralph Nader’s “Public Citizen,” arguing that 
arbitration inhibits individuals from vindicating rights in consumer 
and employment cases.259 The study calls into question (as 
unsubstantiated) the claim that arbitration is more economical than 
court litigation.260 Fees to arbitrators and supervisory organizations 
add to the parties’ expenses.261 And no evidence has been mustered 
that expenses related to witnesses, attorneys, and discovery are lower 
in arbitration than in litigation.262 
 The American Bar Association has also expressed reservations 
about arbitration.263 Although allowing retainer agreements to 
require arbitration of fee disputes and malpractice claims, the ABA 
guidelines require that the client be apprised of arbitration’s 
“advantages and disadvantages,” a requirement that will no doubt 
add some fun to the negotiation of these agreements.264 
                                                                                                                       
Broke After 70 Years under the Uniform Arbitration Act (ABA Annual Meeting, 
Washington D.C., 1997). 
 258. During 2002, the California legislature passed several measures that 
regulated arbitration, effective the first of January 2003. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 
1281.92, 1281.96 (West 2003) (requiring disclosure of information by arbitrators and 
publication of certain information by any “private arbitration company” that 
administers consumer arbitration); see also id. at § 1284.3 (prohibiting in consumer 
arbitration the assessment of fees and costs against the non-prevailing party). Ethics 
standards, adopted in 2002 by the California Judicial Council, reportedly led the 
American Arbitration Association to end its system for arbitrator membership in the 
Association, from fear that AAA membership might be considered evidence of 
arbitrator bias. California Assembly Bill 3029 (passed by the Assembly on August 30, 
2002 and vetoed by Governor Gray Davis on September 30, 2002). 
 259. See Public Citizen, Arbitration Q & A, available at http://www.citizen.org/ 
congress/civjus/arbitration/articles.cfm?ID:7490 (last visited Sept. 15, 2003) (explaining 
why the group opposes arbitration). 
 260. See PUBLIC CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 
(Jackson Williams ed., 2002). For comment on the report, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, 
Publisher’s View on “The Costs of Arbitration,” 20 CPR ALTERNATIVES 103 (May 2002). 
 261. On a societal level, of course, the cost of paying judges would have to be 
factored into any comparison of courts and arbitration. 
 262. See also Mandatory Arbitration Not For All Employers; Cost, Fairness Still 
Subject of Debate, 70 U.S.L.W. (BNA) No. 46, at 2755 (2002) (June 2002) (offering 
general discussion of recent criticisms of consumer arbitration.  
 263. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 
(Feb. 20, 2002). 
 264. Id. (concerning attorneys’ arbitration agreements with clients, which may 
not include limitations of liability). The Opinion is based inter alia on MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT, Rules 1.4, 1.5 (2003) (duty to explain to client risks of alternative 
courses of action and requirements of fee agreements); see also MODEL RULES FOR 
CLIENT PROTECTION: MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION R. 1(c) (2002), which style 
their effect as “voluntary for clients and mandatory for lawyers if commenced by a 
client”; California State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, 
Formal Op. No. 1989-116, 1989 WL 253264, *5-6; D.C. Options No. 211 and 218; cf. 
Henry v. Gonzales, 18 S.W.3d 684, 692-94 (Ct. App. Tex. 2000) (Hardberger, J., 
dissenting) (upholding an arbitration clause in a retainer agreement). See generally 
VII. INVESTOR-HOST STATE ARBITRATIONS 
A. Blurred Lines: The NAFTA Experience 
 To safeguard assets abroad, the United States has traditionally 
encouraged resolution of expropriation claims through arbitration, 
which was presumed to be a fairer and more efficient mechanism to 
determine compensation than either host state courts or gunboat 
diplomacy.265 Recently, however, classic preferences have been 
blurred as have distinctions between host and investor nations and 
between public and private dispute resolution. Many of the litigators 
who focus on private-to-private disputes are now involved in both 
“mixed” arbitration (governments and private investors) and public 
disputes entirely between governments.266 In large measure, the 
transformation results from NAFTA’s investment protection scheme 
which has made the United States and Canada respondents in 
actions brought by investors from other NAFTA countries.267 
Consequently, North American perceptions of international 
arbitration have changed vividly with the press now carrying 
accusations that arbitration involves “secret tribunals” that ignore 
public interest and constitute an “attack on American values.”268 
                                                                                                                       
Steven Quiring, Attorney-Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate Guidelines for 
Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1213 (2002); Alan Scott Rau, Resolving 
Disputes Over Attorneys’ Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2005 (1993).  
 265. See generally Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face 
of NAFTA Arbitration, 28 YALE INT’L L.J. 365 (2003).  See also William W. Park, 
Arbitration and the FISC: NAFTA’s “Tax Veto”, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 236 (2001). 
Arbitration might be conducted pursuant to a private concession, perhaps using 
institutional rules such as those of the ICC, or a non-supervised procedure under the 
UNCITRAL Rules. In the alternative, treaty-based arbitration might go forward under 
the auspices of the World Bank’s ICSID regime or one of the many bilateral investment 
treaties.  
 266. For example, in a recent boundary dispute before the ICJ, a British 
commercial firm (Freshfields) represented claimant, a Canadian commercial arbitrator 
(Yves Fortier) served as ad hoc judge and the co-author of a commercial arbitration 
treatise (Michael Reisman) acted as expert. See ICJ: Case Concering Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain, 40 I.L.M. 847, 
847-52, 859, 896-97 (March 16, 2001) (giving Bahrain sovereignty over certain islands 
in the “Trucial States” placed under British protection in the early 19th century to 
safeguard trading routes with India from plunder by local tribes). See generally 
Malcolm Evans, Decisions of International Tribunals: The International Court of 
Justice, 51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 709, 709-18 (2002). 
 267. See Chapter 11, North American Free Trade Agreement, December 17, 
1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289, 642-46 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Lines have also been 
blurred between public and private arbitration, once considered distinct subjects. At a 
recent symposium of the London Court of International Arbitration, the Deputy 
Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration emphasized that institution’s 
willingness to administer arbitration between private parties as well as between 
sovereign states. Bette Shifman, Remarks at London Court of International Arbitration 
Symposium, Tylney Hall, Rotherwick, England (May 11, 2002). 
 268. An advertisement in the Washington Post attacked investment arbitration 
as a “‘Fast Track’ Attack on America’s Values” with “Secret Courts for Corporations.” 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at A-5 (advertisement placed by the Global Trade 
 
Claims filed against the United States made arbitration look less 
appealing.269 Perceived threats to legislative prerogatives led to 
suggested deviations from traditional arbitration practices such as 
confidentiality. 
 The flap over NAFTA adds new dimensions to the cost-benefit 
analysis of how much discretion should be given to arbitrators 
conducting proceedings and judges reviewing awards. More than 
most commercial arbitration, NAFTA disputes have considerable 
third party effects. Intense review of NAFTA awards violates the 
member countries’ commitment to leave resolution of investment 
disputes to arbitrators.270 The risk of political interference in the 
NAFTA arbitral process is one more reason that international 
arbitration should be subject to a more laissez-faire arbitration 
scheme, which would limit the opportunity for judicial interference. 
At the same time, adoption of specific procedural protocols to be 
applied by arbitrators would likely encourage public respect for the 
arbitral process and thereby reduce the prospect of a backlash that 
would curtail the fair resolution of investment disputes.271  
                                                                                                                       
Watch division of Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen advocacy group). A New York Times 
article accused investment arbitration of leading to “national laws being revoked, 
justice systems questioned and environmental regulations challenged.” Anthony De 
Palma, NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2001, Section 3, at 1. 
Bill Moyers hosted a television special in which NAFTA was called a “sophisticated 
extortion racket” in which “secret NAFTA tribunals can force taxpayers to pay billions 
of dollars in lawsuits.” Now With Bill Moyers: Trading Democracy (PBS television 
broadcast, Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript_tdfull.html. 
For a different approach to the interaction of international trade and governmental 
regulatory structures, see Ronald A. Cass & John Haring, Domestic Regulation and 
International Trade: Where’s the Race? Lessons from Telecommunications and Export 
Controls, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 111, 111-54 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick 
eds., 2002), also published in 11 JOURNAL DES ÉCONOMISTES ET DES ÉTUDES HUMAINES 
531, 531-74 (2001). 
 269. To some observers the U.S. attitude toward investment arbitration 
suggests a double standard (arbitration for U.S. citizens abroad but not when 
foreigners invest here), reminiscent of a character in a Jules Romains novel who liked 
honesty “only in others.” A foreign emissary who helped himself to a share of the bribes 
his government paid French newspapers was shocked that intermediaries had 
skimmed from these payments. See JULES ROMAINS, 2 LES HOMMES DE BONNE 
VOLONTE, Pt. 9 (Montée des Périls), Sec. XXX (Réponse de Marc Strigelius), 335 (Robert 
Laffont ed., 1988) (“M. Coubersky, lequel se charge de prélever sur ces millions une 
gorgée abondante, semble trouver mauvais que les intermédiaires aient une soif parente 
de la sienne. C’est un homme qui aime l’honnêteté d’autrui.”). 
 270. For recent reiterations of this theme, see Charles H. Brower, Beware of the 
Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 465, 479 (2002); 
Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the 
International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 193, 196-202 
(2001). 
 271. In addition to classic investment arbitration, the emerging arbitral 
resolution of international transfer pricing disputes raises similar sovereignty-related 
questions. Although framed as arbitration between two countries, the taxpayer will 
 Essentially, NAFTA Chapter 11 gives business managers from a 
member country the right to arbitrate investment grievances 
regardless of whether an agreement to arbitrate actually exists in a 
negotiated investment concession, thus eliminating foreign investor 
recourse to home country intervention against the host state. The 
initial part of Chapter 11 imposes substantive norms for cross-border 
investment (forbidding discrimination and requiring “fair and 
equitable” treatment as well as compensation for nationalized 
property,)272 while the second portion provides arbitration as a 
remedy for a host state’s breach of its duties.273  
B. Judicial Review and Investment Arbitration 
 An aggrieved investor may choose either arbitration supervised 
by the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or a proceeding conducted under the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules.274 Should the investor want ICSID 
arbitration, however, there is a slight limitation. Neither Mexico nor 
Canada is yet a party to the Washington Convention establishing 
ICSID,275 and thus arbitration must proceed under the so-called 
“Additional Facility” designed to give World Bank supervision outside 
the Convention framework.276 
 Consequently, in any available arbitration forum, NAFTA 
Chapter 11 awards will be subject to judicial review at the place 
where rendered.277 Unlike “pure” ICSID arbitration (where the 
Washington Convention forecloses vacatur motions in national courts 
                                                                                                                       
usually be the real party in interest. The evolution of fiscal arbitration will require 
collaboration between tax and arbitration to create new frameworks for both the 
conduct of the arbitration and judicial review of awards. See generally Brower & 
Steven, supra note 270, at 195-97. 
 272. NAFTA Chapter 11 echoes the compensation criteria traditionally 
advocated by the United States. While the terms “prompt, adequate and effective” 
compensation (which originated in a 1938 communication to Mexico from US Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull) do not appear in the text of Chapter 11, the combination of 
compensation factors listed in NAFTA Article 1110 (“paid without delay,” “fair market 
value” and “fully realizable”) amount to the same result. See Restatement (Third) 
Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 712, cmts. c, d, and Reporter’s n.2 (1987). NAFTA 
Article 1110(1) adopts a four-part structure, requiring that the expropriation (1) have a 
public purpose, (2) be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, (3) “in accordance with 
due process of law and Article 1105(1)” [“fair and equitable treatment”] and (4) result 
in “payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6 [of Article 
1110],” which adopt the fair market value standard. 
 273. See NAFTA, supra note 267, at 639-42. 
 274. Id. at 643. 
 275. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966), in ICSID 
BASIC DOCUMENTS 25 (1985). 
 276. ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES 5 (2003). 
 277. NAFTA, supra note 267, at 643. 
 
in favor of a special system of internal quality control,)278 both 
UNCITRAL and Additional Facility awards may be challenged in 
national courts.279 
 The significance of judicial review of NAFTA awards was 
illustrated in Metalclad,280 in which the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia was required to decide whether a NAFTA award fell under 
its International Commercial Arbitration Act which provides a 
narrower scope of review than the otherwise applicable Provincial 
statute.281 An arbitral tribunal had ordered Mexico to pay 
compensation for acts of the municipality of Guadalcazar that 
prevented operation of a hazardous waste facility owned by U.S. 
citizens. Although hearings were held in Washington D.C. for the 
sake of convenience, the arbitration’s official situs was Vancouver. 
Mexico then petitioned to have a NAFTA award set aside by the 
British Columbia Supreme Court.282  
 Surprisingly, the choice of applicable statute turned on the 
meaning of “commercial” rather than “international.” Mexico argued 
against application of the International Act (which requires that 
arbitration be commercial as well as international) on the ground 
that the proceedings related to a regulatory rather than a commercial 
relationship.283 The court disagreed, finding that the case was 
commercial in the sense that it “arose out of a relationship of 
investing.”284 Characterizing the arbitration by reference to the 
underlying transaction (a cross-border investment) placed the dispute 
within the terms of the International Act. Thus court scrutiny focused 
________________________________________________________________ 
 278. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES art. 52 
(2003).  
 279. Park, supra note 265, at 234-35. 
 280. See Metalclad v. United Mexican States (Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), 5 ICSID 
209, 210-12 (ICSID Aug. 2000) (finding expropriation without adequate compensation 
where a U.S.-owned company was prevented by Mexican municipality from operating a 
hazardous waste facility in Mexico). For the British Columbia Supreme Court decision 
vacating and remanding the award in part, see United Mexican States v. Metalclad, 5 
ICSID 236, 236-38 (Judicial Review, Supreme Ct. of British Columbia (May, 2001), 
deleting certain paragraphs of the prior decision and adjourning the proceedings to 
give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitration for purposes of 
determining certain issues related to a Mexican ecology decree. NAFTA Chapter 11 
proceedings are not the ony investment arbitrations subject to judicial review.  See, 
e.g., Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V. (Svea Court of Appeals, Sweden, May 
15, 2003), with introductory note by Thomas Wälde, 42 I.L.M. 915 (2003). 
 281. The British Columbia Commercial Arbitration Act catches arbitration 
excluded from the International Act (which was based on the UNCITRAL Model Law). 
The domestic statute allows a more generous role for court intervention, including 
appeal on points of law. Metalclad, 5 ICSID 236, 246-48 (2001). 
 282. Id. at 239. 
 283. Id. at 247. 
 284. Id. 
on whether the award exceeded the arbitrators’ powers, rather than 
on whether the arbitrators made a substantive mistake.285  
 Should a court in the United States face a similar scenario, it 
would be unfortunate if the temptation existed to examine the 
substantive merits of a case under the “manifest disregard of the law” 
standard. Arbitration has been selected as the optimum way to 
resolve cross-border investment disputes precisely because the 
parties prefer an adjudicator less political than national courts. The 
FAA’s current universality presents an invitation for mischief. 
C. Political Reaction and Notes of Interpretation 
 For the United States, NAFTA began to create problems when 
Canadian investors brought claims for failure to grant “fair and 
equitable treatment” and de facto expropriation without 
compensation.286 The better known cases included complaints about a 
California ban on gasoline additives,287 a Mississippi jury award 
against a Manitoba funeral director,288 and a Massachusetts court 
decision upholding Boston’s refusal to execute a land sale with a 
Montreal developer.289  
 Political reaction to such NAFTA cases has been intense.290 The 
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 285. In the end, the court refused to set aside the award in its entirety, deciding 
that not all of the arbitrators’ findings exceeded their authority. Id. at 267. 
 286. See generally Methanex Corp. v. USA, Amended Claim filed Feb. 12, 2001, 
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com; Loewen Group. v. United States, Final 
Award, June 26, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003); Jonathon Harr, The Burial, THE NEW 
YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 70. 
 287. Methanex, supra note 286. 
 288. Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Interim 
Award on Jurisdiction, Jan. 5, 2001, Final Award, June 26, 2003 (denying liability) 
(Anthony Mason, Abner J. Mikva & Michael Mustill arbs.), 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003), at 
www.naftaclaims.com. The $500 million verdict included $400 million in punitive 
damages. Appeal required a bond of 125% ($625 million) as security. The rich tapestry 
of this dispute is set forth in Harr, supra note 286, at 70. 
 289. Mondev International Ltd. v. USA, 42 I.L.M. 85, 86, Award, Oct. 2002 
(denying liability) (Ninjan Stephens, James Crawford & Stephen Schwebel arbs.).  See 
generally Jack Coe, Denial of Justice and NAFTA Chapter 11—The Mondev Award, 
3(1) INT’L ARB. NEWS 2 (Winter 2002/2003).  See also Rudolph Kass, How Sharp are the 
Tiger’s Teeth, 47 BOSTON BAR ASS’N JOURNAL 10 (Sept/Oct. 2003). On the underlying 
claim, see the opinion written by Justice Charles Fried (as he then was) in Lafayette 
Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820, 835-37 (Mass. 1998), 
holding that the developer was precluded from suing Boston and the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 290. Current U.S. concerns echo the rhetoric of 19th-century Argentine 
economist Carlos Calvo, who attempted to protect the economic sovereignty of Latin 
America through the “Calvo Doctrine” (first announced in 1868 in LE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE), which required investor submission to local 
courts, effectively eliminating arbitration. See generally, K. Lipstein, The Place of the 
Calvo Clause in International Law, 1945 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 130, 137-45 (1945). In 
1974, the Calvo doctrine was pushed further in the so-called “New International 
Economic Order” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in an attempt 
(unsuccessful as history has shown) to give host state courts an exclusive right to 
determine the measure of compensation for expropriated property. See Charter of 
 
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee endorsed establishment 
of an appellate review of NAFTA awards291 as well as government 
screening of arbitration to avoid having “frivolous or inappropriate 
claims” considered by arbitrators.292 The current version of the 2002 
Trade Act includes an appellate body to correct “manifestly erroneous 
interpretations of law” and a mandate of “transparency” by making 
arbitration proceedings public and allowing amicus curiae 
submissions from both business and labor organizations.293  
 Bowing to what some observers believe to be public pressure in 
the United States, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission in 2001 issued 
Notes of Interpretation, effectively interpreting (or restating, 
depending on perspective) NAFTA requirements so as to limit the 
liability of host countries in connection with several matters currently 
sub judice.294 Responding to the criticism of the confidentiality of 
NAFTA arbitration (referred to by critics as “lack of transparency”), 
the Notes of Interpretation provide that nothing in NAFTA imposes “a 
general duty of confidentiality” on the parties to a Chapter 11 
arbitration.295  
                                                                                                                       
Rights and Duties of States art. 2(2)(c), reprinted in CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
AND DUTIES OF STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND TEXT 35, discussed in William W. Park, 
Legal Issues in the Third World’s Economic Development, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1321, 1327 
(1981).  
 291. See Rossella Brevetti, Baucus Welcomes Options Administration Is 
Considering on Investor-State Disputes, BNA INT’L TRADE, Mar. 28, 2002, at 529 
(discussing Letter of Mar. 26, 2002 from Max Baucus to Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick). In reaction, on Mar. 28, 2002, the Senate Finance Committee’s ranking 
Republican Charles Grassley urged Trade Representative Zoellick to reject such 
screening. See Rosella Brevetti, Grassley Urges Zoellick to Reject Government Screening 
for Investor Suits, REG. LAW & ECONOMICS, Apr. 1, 2002, at A-6. Industry groups, 
including the National Association of Manufacturers, have also expressed concern for 
the preservation of investor protections for U.S.-owned businesses abroad.  
 292. A similar screening mechanism already exists with respect to expropriation 
claims that implicate tax measures. See NAFTA, supra note 267, art. 2103(6).  
 293. See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210 § 2102(b)(3), 116 Stat. 994 
(2002), which includes the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority At of 2001 (H.R. 
3005) and the Andean Trade Preference Act (H.R. 3009), accompanying House of 
Representatives Report 107-518, June 19, 2002. 
 294. A breach of another NAFTA provision or a separate international 
agreement will not in itself establish that “fair and equitable treatment” has been 
denied under Article 1105. The meaning of international law has been limited to 
“customary” minimum standards, thus preventing recourse to other sources of 
international law that might either impose or relax restrictions on host State 
treatment of foreign investors. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The 
New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 397-
98 (2003). 
 295. NAFTA, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 
2001, Part A, reprinted in 13 WORLD TRADE & ARBITRATION MATERIALS, No. 6, 139, 139 
(2002). In this context, it is worth noting that for decades before NAFTA, expropriation 
claims against developing countries had been arbitrated in confidential proceedings 
under ICSID, UNCITRAL and ICC Rules without complaint from the industrialized 
investor nations. 
 Confidentiality is nothing special for NAFTA arbitration but 
represents the long-established practice for most international 
arbitration. Moreover, the jury system in the United States has given 
Americans long experience with secret deliberations and an absence 
of reasoned decision making.  
 To some observers, the Notes of Interpretation constitute de facto 
modification of NAFTA that departs from the member countries’ 
original meaning and thus requires approval in accordance with 
“applicable legal procedures of each Party.”296 To date, no satisfactory 
way has been found to resolve the potential conflict between the 
requirements for amendment under NAFTA and the provisions of 
Chapter 11 that permit Free Trade Commission interpretations.  
 For investment arbitration to fulfill its promise, some 
mechanism must be found to promote greater arbitral sensitivity to 
vital host state interest.297 The ebb and flow of arbitration’s wisdom 
may have to accommodate political reality. While the Notes of 
Interpretation may be helpful to guide arbitrators toward sensitivity 
to the public interest, the task is best accomplished without the 
intervention of national courts. 
 Expropriation cases by their nature engender political fervor, 
which is why NAFTA charges international arbitrators rather than 
national judges with deciding investment disputes. Clearer FAA 
provisions for international arbitration, limiting the grounds for 
judicial review, would be a step in resisting the risk of political 
interference. An occasional “wrong” arbitral award is a small price to 
pay for the net aggregate gain to prosperity through enhanced cross-
border investment.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 Arbitration by its nature is polycentric: one might more 
accurately speak of arbitrations in the plural.  A wide variety of 
disputes are included into one category, implicating differences 
related to the sophistication of the parties, the character of the 
disputes, and the public interests at stake. The current legal 
framework for arbitration conducted in the United States attempts to 
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 296. See NAFTA, supra note 267, art. 2202. One award has suggested that Notes 
of Interpretation which fail to respect the text of NAFTA would not be binding on 
arbitrators deciding Chapter 11 disputes. See In re Pope & Talbot, 41 I.L.M. 1347, 
1362-65 (2002) (ordering Canada to pay $461,556 plus interest in damages). At footnote 
37 (paragraph 47) the Award states, “[w]ere the Tribunal required to make a 
determination whether the [NAFTA Free Trade] Commission’s action is an 
interpretation or an amendment, it would choose the latter.”  
 297. For a caution about backlash toward investor-government arbitration, see 
Michael Goldhaber, Czech Mate, AMERICAN LAWYER, Mar. 2002, at 87 (describing how a 
U.S. investor used arbitration to vindicate expropriation claims against the Czech 
Republic), which quotes a noted international arbitration lawyer warning how a 
Canadian win in a high profile NAFTA case (Loewen) could cause a hostile reaction 
toward NAFTA. 
 
squeeze all types of arbitration into the Procrustean bed of a single 
set of standards for judicial review. 
 The United States should seriously consider eliminating judicial 
discretion to review the substantive merits of awards in international 
cases. The domestically nourished doctrine of “manifest disregard of 
the law” risks misapplication in cross-border contests. The FAA 
should be cantonized into separate regimes for domestic and 
international arbitration, thus permitting the latter to evolve 
independent of whatever protective legislative and judicial initiatives 
might be appropriate to address concerns developed in a domestic 
context.  
 Bifurcated statutes in France and Switzerland, along with the 
type of consumer protection regimes that have been implemented 
through the European Union, could serve as models for the United 
States. Options for different levels of judicial scrutiny of awards 
should be available.  
 No system is likely to find the perfect balance between flexibility 
and certainty. Legislators and courts will be called to a process of 
regular fine-tuning that aims at a reasonable counterpoise between 
competing objectives, giving business managers the appropriate 
climate in which to consummate cross-border transactions. 
 This paper makes no suggestion of radical reform.298 “Go slow” 
seems the best approach. However, for cross-border arbitration to 
reach its full potential, distinctions should be made in judicial review 
of domestic and international awards. 
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 298. Some great Frenchman (both Talleyrand and Valéry have been given 
credit) rightly remarked, “Tout ce qui est excessif est insignificant” (Anything excessive 
becomes insignificant).  
 
 




(a) Except as provided in subsection 1(b), this chapter shall apply to 
any arbitration with its seat in the United States, in which at least 
one party is resident or incorporated outside of the United States at 
the time the agreement to arbitrate was concluded.  
 
(b) Unless the agreement to arbitrate was entered into after the 
dispute arose, this Chapter shall not apply to (i) an employment 
contract in which the yearly remuneration of the employee is less 
than [$ XYZ] or (ii) an agreement concluded with respect to a 
consumer transaction. 
 
(c) A consumer transaction includes any agreement related to 
property, services or credit with any individual for purposes outside 
his trade, business or profession if the amount in dispute is less than 
[$ ABC]. 
 
2. Award Vacatur 
 
In any of the following cases the United States court in the district 
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award 
upon the application of any party to the arbitration: 
 
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under some 
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the applicable 
law; or 
 
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings 
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or 
 
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission 
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so 
submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions 
on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was 
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties; or 
 
(iv) the award was procured by fraud, bias or corruption; 
 
 
(v) the award is in conflict with international public policy or the 
subject matter of the dispute is not capable of being submitted to 
arbitration.  
 
3. Time Limit for Vacatur  
 
An application for setting aside an award covered by this Chapter 
must be brought no later than three (3) months from the date on 
which the party making that application has received the award.  
 
4. Jurisdiction for Vacatur 
 
An action to vacate an award covered by this Chapter may be brought 
only in the district wherein the award was made. In no event may a 
federal court vacate an award made outside the United States. 
 
5. Exclusion of Other Grounds for Vacatur  
 
Unless the parties have explicitly provided for judicial review under 
Chapter 1 of this title, no award covered by this Chapter may be 






1. Separate FAA Chapter or Tinkering with Existing Provisions? 
 
 The proposal set forth above is intended as a stand-alone set of 
rules to cover vacatur of awards in international proceedings 
conducted within the United States. An alternative approach would 
be simply to tinker with the language of Chapters 2 and 3 that 
implement the New York and Panama Convention schemes for 
recognition of foreign and “non-domestic” awards.  
 Admittedly, such a wide net may complicate the prospects for 
adoption of the statute. The more obvious the change, the more likely 
that there will be opposition. From a political perspective, less is often 
more.  
 Two concerns tip the scales in favor of separate provisions. First, 
judicial interpretation of the existing FAA Chapters has often been 
problematic. One may wish to reduce the prospect of ill-advised 
judicial creativity by establishing a framework which, to the extent 
possible, will operate independently of prior case law. Second, a fresh 
start would permit an approach more user-friendly to foreigners, 
particularly if the text of the legislation picks up some of the 
language and format used by the Model Law. 
 
2. Fraud, Bias and Corruption 
 
 The proposed statutory language goes beyond the text of the 
Model Law by suggesting inclusion of “fraud, bias or corruption” as an 
explicit ground for vacatur. Some might argue that this is 
unnecessary. Admittedly, those defects are subsumed under 
“violation of public policy” and “inability to present one’s case,” 
defenses to award enforcement that may be pressed into service 
against bias and corruption under the New York Convention299 as 
well as national arbitration statutes in countries influenced by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.300  
 No good reason argues for leaving these matters to judicial 
interpretation. An explicit prohibition on fraud and corruption, added 
for the avoidance of doubt, is unlikely to be seen to imply that fraud 
and corruption are acceptable in awards subject to the New York 
Convention. Moreover, inclusion of fraud, bias and corruption as 
grounds for vacatur could be expected to make the legislation more 
politically palatable. Otherwise, one can easily imagine complaints 
that the legislative proposal lacked the most basic protections. 
Explicit statutory language seems far more likely to convince 
Congress of the proposal’s fairness than reference to learned foreign 
treatises that link bias and fraud to public policy violations.  
 
3. Definition of International Arbitration 
 
 The scope of the proposed legislation is narrower than that of 
both FAA Chapter 2 and the UNCITRAL Model Law. The former 
includes even disputes between U.S. citizens as long as they implicate 
property or contract performance abroad. The Model Law combines 
multiple tests, bringing within its scope arbitrations in which (i) 
parties have places of business in different countries, (ii) the place of 
contract performance or the place of arbitration is outside the parties’ 
home country, or (iii) the parties opt to treat the proceedings as 
international. 
 A residence-based test seems more sensible.301 The linguistic 
and procedural differences that justify a laissez-faire arbitration 
regime are likely to arise when U.S. residents seek to avoid courts in 
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 299. See, e.g., ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958 
302, 306, 331, 377-82 (1981) (addressing the scope of Articles V(1)(b) (inability to 
present his case) and Article V(2)(b) (violation of public policy)). 
 300. With respect to public policy under the Swiss LDIP, see generally P. 
LALIVE, J.F. POUDRET, & C. REYMOND, LE DROIT DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNE ET 
INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE 430 (1989), insisting that ordre public has a procedural (as 
well as substantive) aspect capable of rectifying abusive arbitrator behavior. 
 301. Corporate entities should probably be considered residents if organized 
under the law of, or possessing a principal place of business in, the forum country. 
Thus, for example, a U.S. branch of a foreign corporation would be considered a U.S. 
resident, as would an alien individual present in the United States more than 183 days 
during any calendar year.  
 
Paris, Rio or Shanghai, rather than when one U.S. citizen sues 
another in New York over goods and/or services destined for export.  
 
4. Opt-out Provisions 
 
 Some litigants may want the greater protection afforded by 
whatever paternalistic intervention might be afforded under FAA 
Chapter 1. Some commentators fear that expansion of judicial review 
would change the character of arbitration. However, freedom of 
contract would likely have beneficial effects on balance, reducing the 
apprehension of “wild card” awards in high stakes cases affecting the 
proverbial family jewels of a litigant. At least as between 
sophisticated parties to an international contract, the right to elect 
merits review would appear to be almost a corollary of the right to 
elect courts. By contrast, good arguments exist for denying the right 
to exclude all court scrutiny, given that an award takes on a 
presumptive validity throughout the world under the New York 
Convention. In other words, the statutory framework for judicial 
review of international arbitration in the United States would 
constitute a floor but not a ceiling.  
 
5. Public Policy 
 
 In the hope of reducing an overly parochial use of public policy, 
the statutory proposal adopts the French distinction between public 
policy applicable to domestic cases and public policy applicable to 
international cases. The latter concept, referred to as ordre public 
international, derives from the policy national courts consider 
relevant to cross-border transactions with no direct impact on the 
forum. Thus, for example, an interest rate that would violate public 
policy in a purely domestic transaction might be acceptable in a cross-
border context. 
 
6. Consumers and Employees 
 
 The type of laissez-faire judicial review scheme proposed for 
international contracts between sophisticated parties is not 
appropriate for consumer transactions and employment contracts, 
where heightened court scrutiny provides a healthy measure of 
paternalistic protection for the weaker party. One might argue that 
such restrictions also belong in other parts of the FAA and perhaps 
also in the New York Convention itself. Indeed that would seem 
eminently sensible, and might well be on the agenda of those seeking 
to improve other parts of arbitration’s legal framework.  
 
7. Jurisdiction for Award Vacatur 
 
 By limiting vacatur to the place where the award is made, the 
proposed legislation makes clear that U.S. courts should not be in the 
business of setting aside decisions in foreign arbitrations. Contrary to 
the implication in Cortez Byrd,302 defects in awards rendered abroad 
can best be addressed if and when they are presented for recognition 
and/or enforcement in the United States.  
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 302. See, e.g., Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 203, 
203 (2000) (justifying adoption of expansive venue requirements as a way to permit an 
“action under the FAA in courts of the United States to . . . vacate awards rendered in 
foreign arbitrations not covered by either convention”). 
